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Introduction
This paper proposes a new methodology 
of appropriation of modern cosmological ideas 
in the context of the nowadays popular dialogue 
between science and religion. It does not aim to 
compare contemporary mathematically arranged 
cosmological ideas with the theologically 
expressed experience of communion with God. 
The author believes that it would be incongruous 
to bring the cosmological views of the Fathers of 
the Church (which historically had been rooted 
in ancient Greek philosophy and astronomy) into 
correlation with the experimental and theoretical 
results of modern cosmology. Similar to this, 
it seems doubtful to conduct a comparative 
hermeneutics of the scriptural texts with modern 
writings on cosmology in an attempt to reveal 
some linguistic parallels: such a comparison 
would exhibit an arbitrary approach which is 
dictated neither by the needs of theology nor 
by the logic of science. The author develops his 
argument starting from the premise that there is 
a fundamental asymmetry between cosmology, 
as a definite form of activity and thinking, and 
that philosophico-theological consciousness 
which exercises its reflection upon cosmology. 
This asymmetry consists in a simple fact that 
although philosophical and theological motives 
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enter implicitly any speculations on the universe, 
cosmology, as a scientific discipline cannot 
explicate these motives. The motives which are 
implied here enter our discussion as a certain 
attitude of consciousness which is determined 
by an ambivalent position of humanity in the 
universe, that is, on the one hand, being included 
in or contained by the universe, and, on the other 
hand, containing the universe as a representation 
and articulated reality within consciousness.
It follows from what has been said that a 
“comparison” between theology and science 
has sense only in the context of the problem of 
man as a carrier and expositor of cosmology as 
well as theology. It is, humanity that becomes 
a core element of the dialogue between science 
and religion; for it’s in human being that the 
split of intentionalities of consciousness towards 
the objectivised and alienated world on the one 
hand, and towards the underlying foundation 
of the world, as well as the very articulating 
consciousness of this world, that is God, on 
the other hand, takes place. Theology and 
cosmology turn out to be intertwined simply 
because of the paradoxical position of humanity 
in the universe, being a physical and biological 
mechanism in this world, and at the same time, 
being a carrier of the Divine image not of this 
world.
Let us elucidate this last point. If one 
poses a question: “Why does theology need 
cosmology?”, a simple empirical answer comes 
to mind. Since the very possibility of theology 
is determined by the actual existence of those 
to theologise, that is human persons, then 
in order to theologise one needs necessary 
physical and biological conditions for existence 
of these persons, which, as it is not difficult to 
comprehend, are rooted in cosmic conditions. 
It is cosmology that explicates these necessary 
conditions. From here on, one infers that any 
theological proposition, expressing experience 
of the Divine in the world implicitly contains 
in itself truth about that very world, where this 
experience occurs.
If one inverts the above question and 
asks: “Why does cosmology need theology?”, 
one can respond to it through the following 
observation. Cosmology predicates the factual 
state of affairs in the physical universe without 
clarifying the sense of the sufficient conditions 
which are in the foundation the very possibility 
of knowledge and explication of the universe by 
human persons. Theology interprets this point 
by pointing out that only human beings have 
the rational ability to transcend the boundaries 
of the physically finite, including their bodies 
and the attuned living space, and integrate in 
their consciousness the sense of the infinite and 
eternal. Consciousness and reason characterise 
the human condition in the universe and 
cannot be explained through their reduction 
to the physical thus remaining an inexplicable 
mystery whose elucidation and interpretation is 
possible only through the recourse to theology 
of the Divine image in man. Correspondingly 
any cosmological proposition about the world 
becomes implicitly imbued with theology of the 
Divine image. 
The same can be expressed philosophically. 
Since theology as well as cosmology are products 
of one and the same human subjectivity, that 
is two different types of the living experience 
and self-comprehension of its place in being, 
no existential contradiction between these two 
types of experience is possible. The contradiction 
appears only when experience of living is 
reduced to the phenomenality of objects where 
the presence of the human insight in the world 
is lost and the structure of the world is infolded 
from the position of some disincarnate subject. 
What is missed in this treatment of the world 
is that the very possibility of such an objective 
picture of the world is still rooted in the innate 
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“simultaneous synthesis of the universe” as an 
inherent feature of consciousness of a physically 
real person.
A careful insight into cosmological ideas 
allows one to discover the presence of the human 
subjectivity even in those conditions when 
cosmology attempts to “crush this subjectivity 
under the pile of astronomical facts”. Here a 
genuine human theological fidelity is revealed 
when humanity resists this crushing and remains 
faithful to its intrinsic conviction of the centrality 
of its position in the universe, of being the centre 
of disclosure and manifestation of all powers and 
processes in it. To restore the central status of 
humanity in the universe through an existential 
and phenomenological “deconstruction” of 
cosmology will mean to uncover the hidden 
theological commitment in cosmological 
research. 
Such a methodological position with respect 
to the elucidation of the sense of cosmology 
positions the philosophy employed as not a 
“neutral” form of thought, but as imbued with 
existential meaning and theological connotations 
for a philosophical reflection as well as scientific 
theories are “inserted” (bracketed in) in experience 
of existence, that is experience of communion 
with God as the source of this existence. Thus this 
methodology aims to conduct the philosophical 
analysis of those logical operations of the human 
mind in research of the universe from within a 
hidden philosophico-theological “obviousness” 
which is essential to all acts of consciousness, 
including scientific ones. Starting from this 
obviousness cosmology is explicated as a certain 
way of interrogating the reality of the world as 
well as that of human beings themselves. Such a 
philosophically and theologically “enlightened” 
treatment of cosmology, despite its sheer 
deviation from main-stream science is, in our 
opinion, very timely because it elucidates not 
only an existential sense of what cosmologists 
speak of the universe, but also the sense of what 
they are speaking of themselves, that is of human 
beings incarnate in this universe and capable of 
speculating about it. Thus, the main interest of 
this article is not so much in the sense of physical 
realities which cosmology attempts to constitute, 
but in the ways this constitution originates in 
the anthropological and psychological aspects 
of humanity’s existence which express basic 
anxieties of existence, its theological mystery. 
Our interest is not in describing of that which 
is in the universe as if this description would be 
self-evident and not needing any further analysis, 
but in investigating of how this very description 
became possible. This is a philosophical objective 
which cannot be fulfilled without recourse to 
theology. Correspondingly, the search for the 
ultimate foundations of cosmological knowledge 
cannot avoid a certain “theological commitment” 
which is related to the stance on the nature and 
essence of the knowing subject1. At the same 
time, the enquiry into those original conditions 
in the study of the universe without which this 
study would not be possible explicates this 
hidden theological commitment. The analysis 
of the conditions of knowledge is called in 
philosophy “transcendental”. This analysis deals 
with two fundamental issues: 1) the intrinsic 
interlink between human consciousness and the 
possibility of sensing, judging and reasoning 
about the universe; in short: the universe can 
be presented in thought and knowledge only 
as constituted within certain transcendental 
delimiters related to the structures of embodied 
subjectivity; 2) it is because of the physical and 
epistemological incommensurability between 
the universe and human beings, that the universe 
always remains a transcendent background of any 
transcendental knowledge. The “relationship” 
between the universe and human beings is 
established on the principles of freedom, that 
is free thinking (related to what Kant called the 
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faculty of reflective judgement, and theologians 
call free will). This freedom implies that the 
universe and humanity interact on the ways of 
their mutual constitution: the universe is a never 
accomplished mental creation whereas human 
subjectivity is the self-correcting structural 
unity of apperception, the unity which originates 
in the thought (intuition and imagination) of 
infinity of the universe. A theological stance 
in this transcendental analysis is that humanity 
remains free and responsible in its thinking of 
the universe, because this thinking implies free 
action, free judgement and choice of theoretical 
options, which is not subordinated either to the 
rigidity of the structures of subjectivity, or to the 
material content of the universe. A theological 
stance is the possibility of transcendence in 
cognitive actions, the transcendence either as 
longing for the incommensurable content of 
the universe, or as a resistance to any forms 
of thought which position humanity as part of 
the cosmic determinism, denying its ability to 
avoid the dissolution and crush by the mounting 
number of facts about the universe2. Finally, a 
theological stance in the transcendental analysis 
of cosmology, is the commitment to the view that 
the very facticity of the subject of transcendental 
knowledge, that is a human person, originates in 
and through communion with the divine, as the 
giver of life and provider of its image. 
The study of cosmology through the 
prism of the philosophically and theologically 
weighted mind is not in tune with the modern 
way of treating the real in terms of the palpable 
and scientifically representable matter. In this 
sense, such a study is untimely, that is out of tune 
with the present, in the same way as philosophy, 
which deals with the phenomena (in our case the 
universe) that cannot encounter any immediate 
response from wider humanity, is untimely. Thus 
philosophical enquiry in cosmology imbued with 
a theological commitment reveals itself in an 
autonomous existence such that it makes things 
more difficult and complicated. However, here 
lies the advantage of a philosophical interrogation 
of cosmology as an autonomously functioning 
consciousness above and beyond that mass-
consciousness which functions in the natural 
attitude. Sceptics and nihilists, whose presence 
among intellectuals bears a sign of our times, can 
raise a disarming question as to whether it is worth 
doing at all: “What for to study the foundations of 
the universe?”, or, correspondingly, “What for to 
understand the sense of humanity?” The response 
to these questions comes from the definition of 
philosophy as love for wisdom (philo-sophia) 
and truth (aletheia) which imply love in general 
as a major characteristic of the human condition 
understood theologically. To enquire into the 
sense of the universe means not only to know 
it, but to be in communion with it, to love it. 
The philosophically and theologically oriented 
cosmology is not “knowledge” achievable and 
ready to use. This philosophical cosmology 
belongs to the realm of those perennial aspects 
of the human quest for the sense of being which 
can be addressed only in the rubrics of the so 
called negative certitude3 pertaining to the 
long-lived traditional theology which does not 
provide us with a definite discursive judgement 
on the existence of God and what God is; this 
question drives the human reason only to one 
possible answer: it is certain, but this certainty is 
negative, so that one cannot answer this question 
in rubrics of reason alone. In similarity with 
theology when cosmology dares to predicate 
the “universe as a whole”, or “multiverse” (the 
plurality of the worlds), the outcome of this 
predication does not resolve the present scientific 
uncertainty about their actual existence, rather it 
brings us back to the same “negative certitude” 
in which no answer to the question of “What?”, 
“Why?” etc. related to the universe as a whole is 
possible. 
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 Correspondingly a philosophical enquiry 
within a theological commitment in cosmology 
cannot be judged on the grounds of some simplified 
either scientific or common sense criteria. 
Philosophical cosmology within a theological 
commitment characteristically contributes to 
understanding and formation of humanity through 
its interaction with the universe. It represents 
cosmology as a general strategy of acquisition 
of the world, the strategy which manifests the 
ongoing incarnation of humanity in the universe, 
or in rather theological terms, the “humanisation” 
of the cosmos. In this sense, philosophical 
cosmology within a theological commitment is 
directly related to philosophical anthropology 
as well as to the discourse of personhood. Both 
of them are concerned with the ancient question 
raised in Greek philosophy “why is there existence 
rather than nothing?” Contemporary physical 
cosmology attempts to respond to this question, 
however its forms of thought remain intrinsically 
unadjusted to this type of interrogation. Saying 
differently, cosmology is content with what it 
says in physical terms and what one says about it 
as it exists. However, to understand the sense of 
cosmology one needs to establish a new type of 
“questioning of cosmology” in which thinking is 
evolving beyond what was stated by cosmology 
itself. Here one needs an “enlightened” reason, 
or, as it was expressed by Nietzsche, a “great 
reason” which, on the one hand, is associated 
with the embodiment in flesh of the universe and 
which would represent cosmology as a specific 
way of appropriation of the world. On the other 
hand this “great reason” is related to the Divine 
image in man, which humanity attempts to 
restore and fulfil, making thus the process of 
the humanisation of the universe its communion 
with the Divine. In this sense, any philosophical 
cosmology confesses a free type of thinking 
which is not constrained by the findings of the 
scientific and thus transcends physical cosmology 
by bringing it to the next circle of understanding 
the essence of being and humanity. The issue is 
not to think of the essence of cosmology, which 
would be equivalent to being restricted to its 
contemporary forms, regardless as to whether we 
judge it positively or negatively. It is important 
to realise that by questioning cosmology 
philosophically and theologically we overcome 
its seeming neutrality with respect to us thus 
advancing our understanding of the very being 
of cosmology as being in us. Cosmology is acting 
in producing its theories, but it does not think in 
a philosophical sense (compare with a famous 
Heidegger’s assertion that science does not think). 
The sense of cosmology can become enlightened 
only when the gulf between its particular theories 
and human thinking in general is realised.
To establish the sense of cosmology starting 
from cosmology itself, this cosmology must evolve 
in a radically reflective, that is, ranscendental 
mode, that is, in fact, to become philosophy. The 
sense of its theories can be grasped only within 
a critique originating in experience. And there 
is the realm of transcendental self-experience 
which can be established through a method of 
phenomenological reduction. This reduction 
aims to overcome a “natural naïveté”, that is, 
a belief in that cosmology only deals with the 
things of the outer world. Its ultimate objective 
could be seen as questioning the neutrality of 
cosmological propositions (their invariance) 
with respect to specific historically contingent 
events of knowing. To remove the elements in 
this contingency would imply the return to those 
irreducible certainties which would represent 
the universe as pertaining to the essence of 
one’s conscious life. It is from this life, with 
its mundane experiences, that the universe is 
constituted on the basis of its phenomenality. Life 
is not anymore understood here as an empirical 
psycho-physiological life which belongs to 
the universe, but as the transcendental self-
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apprehension which comes forth and from within 
which the universe emerges as its intentional 
correlate. By inverting this last proposition, 
one can assert that it is through cosmology 
that transcendental subjectivity is revealed 
as overcoming its own incarnate boundaries. 
Indeed, by stripping off the layers of the physical 
and biological one comes to discover that the 
universe as a whole appears as an intentional 
correlate of transcendental consciousness. Thus 
“putting out of play” the contingent aspects of the 
universe brings cosmology to a discourse of the 
transcendental subject, as that centre of disclosure 
and manifestation of the universe through which 
the latter acquires its own “voice”4.
However, even this transcendental 
reduction does not guarantee that we do not fall 
into a “transcendental naïveté”. This naivety 
amounts to thinking that reality presupposes the 
transcendental subject as that pre-given context-
horizon within which this reality unfolds. But 
this transcendental subject still functions as 
an embodied creature, that is in the world of 
physical things. However, the very physical 
things do exist for this subject only as constituted 
by it. With regard to the universe as a whole, the 
situation is different: its alleged totality cannot 
be constituted by the subject but, vice versa, the 
subject itself is being constituted by the universe 
(not in a trivial physical sense). In order to clarify 
this thought one must remind the reader that 
cosmology, as a historically concrete science, 
is capable of making its claims on the structure 
and evolution of the universe within the limits 
of what can be called “positive incertitude”, that 
is that certainty which is local in time and is 
subject to amendment and falsification. This can 
be expressed in different words as that scientific 
conceptual signifiers never exhaust the content of 
that which is supposed to be signified. “Positive 
incertitude” in science can be also described in 
terms of the so called apophaticism (which is well 
known since patristic times in theology) asserting 
a simple truth that the appearances of things and 
constitutions by the finite consciousness deal 
with a particular, incomplete phenomenality 
which pertains to objects. With regard to things 
beyond simple perception and nominations 
which exceed the capacity of constitution and 
phenomenality, one can conjecture only in terms 
of aberrations and approximations. The fact that 
we can see and speculate about some aspects 
of the universe does not entail that there are no 
other aspects of existence than those which are 
present and perceived by us, but whose presence 
cannot be affirmed in terms of consciousness and 
knowledge. A simple physical example of such a 
hidden aspect of the universe is its dark matter 
and dark energy that constitute, according to 
theory 96% of the overall matter content of the 
universe. However, the phenomenality of these 
theoretical constructs is poor: physics does not 
know what particular particles and field stand 
behind these constructs. A philosophical example 
of concealment related to the universe as a whole 
can be taken as its own contingent facticity, the 
sense of which cannot probably be disclosed to 
humanity at all. Indeed, the notion of the universe 
as a whole, which is claimed to be a subject matter 
of cosmology, allows one only to have some 
precarious and incomplete definitions related 
to the fundamental finitude (spatial, temporal, 
historical etc) of the subject of knowledge. 
However, this “positive incertitude” of cosmology 
does not mean that from a philosophical point of 
view one must disdain cosmology as irrelevant 
to any perennial questions. It just implies 
that the cosmological research has to proceed 
along the lines of the scientific method in clear 
understanding that the universe as a whole will 
never be constituted at all. Then the persistence 
of cosmology exhibits the courage and heroism of 
scientists in following their quest for the universe 
despite the ultimate futility of any hope to have 
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this universe as an object of science. The same 
takes place in theology when believers explicate 
their experience of God as an open-ended 
process in a clear consciousness that the true 
names of the Divine are beyond this age and any 
denominations. Correspondingly, in cosmology 
the persistence of research as a purposive activity 
of humanity is pointing towards its telos, that 
is the telos of research, which, as such is also 
beyond this age and any denominations. Here 
is a fundamental paradox of cosmology, as well 
as any other science, namely, that its incertitude 
is that condition of its progress consisting in the 
unceasing correction and amendment of its results 
and theories. However, in spite of the fact that a 
human person cannot constitute the universe, so 
that the universe saturates its intuition and blocks 
the reason, this person remains an independent 
centre of disclosure and manifestation of the 
universe, resisting any attempt to be crushed by 
the grandeur of being. In this sense, the “negative 
certitude” in relation to knowledge of the 
universe, turns out to be a constructive certitude 
of constituting the human subject. By interacting 
with the infinity of the universe human persons 
form themselves: in the measure that humanity 
is incapable of constituting the universe as a 
whole, the human person is constituted by the 
universe as an “object” of humanity’s constant 
interest and anxiety of its own position in it. 
This means that the transcendental subject which 
appropriates the universe into the sphere of its 
own subjectivity and which is destined to carry 
out the phenomenological reduction with the 
goal of revealing the immanent belonging of the 
universe to consciousness of the subject, is the 
forming and changing subject, who is formed and 
changed through this very appropriation. One can 
summarise by saying that the understanding of the 
sense of cosmology implies the understanding of 
the formation of self-consciousness of humanity’s 
position in the universe subject to one important 
condition: the cosmological picture does not 
diminish the place of man in the universe as the 
centre of its disclosure and manifestation. The 
more cosmology proves that human being is no 
more than a speck of dust in the universe, the 
more the human person resists this by defending 
the sense of its existence. That which has been 
said partially explains the sense of what we 
asserted earlier that the human “I” is constituted 
by the universe. 
But the shift of the centre of cosmological 
enquiry into the life of transcendental 
subjectivity still retains the same perennial 
question of the facticity of this very subjectivity. 
If it is claimed that the characteristic feature of 
personal existence, that is human hypostatic 
being, is its ability to resist scientific tendencies 
of denigrating humanity by dissolving it in the 
natural and cosmic, and, hence, to understand the 
cosmic conditions of the human existence only 
as the necessary ones, then the question arises 
as to what is the ground and foundation of the 
contingent facticity of hypostatic existents, that is 
persons, that is where do the sufficient conditions 
of the human existence come from? Certainly 
one can take a classical existentialist’s position 
which makes this last question devoid of any 
sense, for one cannot abstract from the already 
present event of life. However, this stance is 
unsatisfactory for a theologically inclined mind, 
who wants to see in the very fact of conscious 
existence the manifestation of truth (aletheia) 
in an absolute sense. So that the acceptance of 
conscious existence as an absolute reference 
point of any further philosophising implies belief 
in the truth of existence. Thus, the knowledge of 
the universe as unfolded from within the human 
subjectivity is by its essence committed to a 
simple existential faith. For a sceptical scientist 
or for a modern atheist it would be problematic to 
proceed from existential faith to religious faith, 
that is to the conviction that truth has foundation 
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in God, for any reference to the Divine would 
imply transcendence, principally impossible in 
science and prohibited by the very essence of the 
phenomenological reduction5. However, and this 
is our main point, the very reduction as well as the 
functioning of consciousness will be impossible at 
all if the reference to the source of its contingent 
facticity would be eidetically removed. In such 
a case, the removal of God as the foundation 
of consciousness would lead inevitably to a 
suggestion that there must be another, transworldy 
foundation of this consciousness which would be 
analogous to the idea of God, that God which was 
previously bracketed out. Correspondingly we 
return back to the assertion that any hypothetical 
reduction of God would imply the cessation of 
functioning of consciousness itself. This is one of 
the motivations of contemporary phenomenology 
to argue that even if facticity of consciousness 
cannot be justified, it can at least be explicated 
through dealing with the saturated phenomena 
which, in a way, constitute this consciousness6.
To understand the sense of cosmology within 
a theological commitment is thus to understand 
the existential sense of the universe, or, to be more 
precise, to “understand” what it means to think of 
or commune with the universe. What could it mean 
the thinking of or communion with the universe 
in the conditions of a scientific and technological 
age in order to avoid this thinking being enslaved 
by the sphere where knowledge is operated 
according to some social, but still historically 
contingent standards? Correspondingly, how 
could we dress this thinking in words while 
avoiding all cultural superstitions which engulf 
our language? And even in the case where we 
believed that we have achieved such a goal, could 
we expect any recognition of that form of thinking 
which intentionally extends beyond the view of the 
universe which is framed by varieties of scientific 
projects, conference discussions and numerous 
publications? All these questions implicitly 
presuppose that the scientific way of thinking of 
the universe does not cover the fullness of our 
communion with the universe which is concealed 
in the very fact of our existence. This concealment 
follows, for example, from the fact that humanity 
is able to interact not only with the physical world 
of corporeal objects, but also with the realm 
of intelligible forms, to which cosmology can 
attest only indirectly. To think of the universe 
is thus to explicate the sense of the universe on 
existential grounds, where our understanding of 
the adjective “existential” follows from the sense 
which was asserted by existentialists in the 20th 
century, namely, that human life and existence is 
the primary and unquestionable metaphysical fact 
from which the whole reality is unfolded7. And 
this, as we have mentioned above, contributes to 
the perennial issue of how to think of humanity. 
Thinking of the universe in existential categories 
thus implies the extended vision and perception 
of the universe, which, in words of the 7th century 
Byzantine saint, Maximus the Confessor, is the 
makro-anthropos, that is that which was created 
in order to be humanised. 
To think of the universe on the grounds 
of existential communion entails freedom of 
such thinking. It does not necessarily imply 
the overthrowing of scientific authority in the 
questions of physical cosmology: it implies 
that cosmological theories and hypotheses can 
be interpreted not as propositions about outer 
realities but as movements of the human heart 
and spirit which reflect a fundamental anxiety of 
existence. In this case the universe is perceived 
as a certain whole, whose partial phenomenality 
is explicated by science. This whole includes not 
only the physically fragmented or united cosmos, 
but it includes the infinity of human life (the 
infinity of relations of human beings to created 
existents) in the universe. Correspondingly all 
accumulated forms of knowledge, established in 
history to this very date, are merely pieces and 
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moments, temporary and provisional sketches 
of the immensely mysterious phenomenon 
of personal beings. The “non-technological” 
thinking of the universe, even if it will not be 
able to reproduce this “whole of the universe” 
(which was, however, attempted in works of 
art and poetry) and hence will remain no more 
than a symbol rather than reality, can receive 
its justification in a deep hope, that through this 
thinking we learn something of ourselves which 
has never been present in our vision of all. Being 
an intentional thinking, thinking of the universe 
as a whole brings that one who thinks beyond any 
conditional objectification and positivity which 
could seem as that which fulfils this thinking. In 
a way, thinking of the universe is transcending 
the limits of thought at all which requires from 
the enquirer exceptional discipline, courage and 
humility in front of the fact that the task will 
never be fulfilled and that they are ready to learn 
of themselves something which could shatter the 
image of their own “I”8.
By thinking of the universe as a whole, we 
attempt to explicate our intrinsically ambivalent 
existential situation, being a part of the universe, in 
its particular time and space, and at the same time 
being at “that” paradoxically central “nowhere” 
from which the wholeness of the universe is 
unfolded. Some cosmologists can object to this 
by saying that in terms of time we are living in 
a very special era in the universe, that it is only 
now that it is possible to detect the universe’s 
evolution, its origin in the Big Bang etc9. The 
universe as described by specific cosmological 
theories is not contingent from the point of view 
of these models. However, from the point of view 
of the very possibility of such a description, that is 
from the point of view of the contingent facticity 
of life of knowing persons, it is still contingent. 
The pole of “nowhere” remains intact simply 
because cosmology, which deals with the physical 
background for existence of embodied human 
persons (that is, its necessary conditions) is not 
able to shed the light on the nature of the sufficient 
conditions of existence of intelligent observers 
and theoreticians of the universe. It is this pole 
of “nowhere” in thinking of the universe that 
deprives this thinking of any essential historical 
goal, which could be placed at the service of any 
intellectual or social-political economy, if it is not 
related to the saving ideals of Christianity. Being 
engaged in thinking of the universe as a whole 
we are immersed not so much into the present of 
the scientific discourse of the universe but into 
the present of thinking itself. And this present is 
dictated not only by the advance of contemporary 
physical theories of the universe but to a great 
extent by the advance of thinking per se, that is 
its free philosophical mode which is not subjected 
to the logic of the already known but follows that 
which Husserl called humanity’s “infinite tasks” 
(Husserl, 1970, p. 279). Here it is appropriate to 
quote K. Jaspers, rephrasing a little his text, that 
our historical consciousness of the universe, in 
spite of being a temporal phenomenon, is a “free-
flying” consciousness without “any ground and 
original point accessible to knowledge, ultimately 
rooted in that source which is always and 
necessarily present in ourselves” (Jaspers, 1982, 
p. 77). This type of thinking, flying away from 
mundane realities and technological delimiters, 
will reveal deeper and clearer the fact of our, as 
Heidegger termed it, “planetary homelessness” 
(but still centrality) which pertains to the present 
intellectual, social and political unpredictability 
of the human condition. One must, perhaps, 
amplify this point by using the term “cosmic 
homelessness” implying the lack of understanding 
of the human place in the whole universe. We are 
homeless because the universe is infinite, and 
in spite of some claims of our centrality in the 
universe, we still do not know our place in it, that 
is we do not know scientifically the grounds of our 
facticity in it. What we know for sure, however, 
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is that it is us who articulate the universe, so that, 
perhaps, as some claim, we are in the centre of 
the universe, but the question of “where” this 
very centre ultimately is, remains in the field of 
perennial certitudes négatives. 
While Jaspers could say that the realisation 
of “cosmic homelessness” (as the denial of 
the historical consciousness) becomes “the 
metaphysical consciousness of being (Sein), 
which being constantly present, must become 
evident in true being (Dasein), as if in eternally 
present” (Ibid.), according to Heidegger, our 
“cosmic homelessness”, that is inability to answer 
questions about own essence, drops a shadow of 
doubt with regard to being of the universe itself 
(our “cosmic homelessness” can be qualified as 
non-being)10. Then it is from this perspective of 
our own finitude, mortality, non-attunement to 
and incommensurability with the universe that 
one must have the courage to think of the universe 
in order to assert ourselves. However, this 
assertion of ourselves has a particular spiritual 
importance only for those who still value the 
humanity of the humans, naturalness of nature, 
justice of the police, and other perennial values 
which crown man in the centre of the world, for 
whom this world is given to fulfil the “infinite” 
task of finding its destiny in the union with the 
Creator of the universe and the giver of life. 
Thinking of the universe leads one to thinking of 
God and it is in this that this thinking follows a 
hidden theological commitment. 
It is not difficult to see that thinking of the 
universe as if we think of the thinking itself at 
present, allows one to establish certain liturgical 
connotations as articulations of the overall 
temporal span of the universe, its past, present 
and future in conscious acts which fight oblivion 
which pertains to the eternal flux of being. When 
articulated, the universe is being remembered not 
only as its realised past. The question of active 
remembrance of the universe, is the question of 
such an understanding of human life in which past, 
present and future are not considered anymore as 
signs of the all-annihilating Kronos, but as being 
able to be integrated through remembrance in the 
image of humanity living in tension between a 
thanksgiving for existence and a hope for its non-
transient sense11. To study the universe does not 
mean to establish a simple vision of the world 
on the grounds of mundane curiosity or personal 
needs. It rather forms a vision of that “selfhood” 
of the universe (as the makro-anthropos) which 
is truly important for one’s existence and which 
brings to unconcealment of the truth of the 
human existence. When we speak of the “self” of 
the universe, we do not presume that it does have 
hypostatic features but, allegorically speaking, 
humanity by looking at the “face” of the universe, 
sees this “face” as looking at themselves, and 
it is this all-penetrating “glance” of the makro-
anthropos that forms the image of humanity as 
its ability to see the infinite in the finite. In a 
certain sense human beings, as they are sustained 
by this last mentioned glance, want to respond 
to it thus asserting not only their longing for the 
commensurability with the universe, but also their 
infinitely transcending lordship over the universe 
resisting their cosmographic insignificance 
and a fear of being crushed under the weight of 
astronomical facts. Pascal compared man with 
reed, thinking reed, in the universe, the weakest 
but thinking element in the chain of being, so that 
a drop of water can kill a man and the universe 
does not need to arm itself in order to crush man. 
“But even if the universe should crush him, man 
still would be more noble than that which kills 
him, since he knows he is mortal, and knows 
that the universe is more powerful than he is: but 
the universe itself knows nothing of it. All our 
dignity, then consists in thought. It is through 
thought alone that we have to lift ourselves up, 
and not through space or time which we cannot 
fill”12. 
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The freedom in thinking of the universe, 
however, has its delimiters; this freedom does not 
imply an arbitrary rule in this thinking, first of 
all, its spiritual arbitrariness. When we brought 
the reader to the thought that thinking of the 
universe is accompanied by thinking of God, we 
were conscious that there always was a danger of 
a “divinisation” of the universe. Here one means 
not a naïve and outdated pagan perception of the 
cosmos as a living organism or the place where 
gods corresponding to different astronomical 
objects are abiding. It is a much more refined 
form of spirituality which is implied here, rooted 
in the sense of immanence of the universe, its 
infinity as an actually existent mystery which 
does not need any reference to the personal trans-
worldly ground of the world. Cosmology in this 
case becomes a spiritual exercise since it is based 
in the life of the spirit; however, the demarcation 
between such a “spiritual cosmology” and 
theological commitment arises at that point 
when human beings make a distinction between 
the universe as a necessary condition of their 
existence (that is an immanent medium of their 
inhabitation) on the one hand, and God, as an 
underlying transcendent sufficient ground of the 
very possibility of life and vision of the universe 
on the other hand. Speaking theologically, there is 
here a difference of a soteriological order, so that 
to avoid arbitrariness in thinking of the universe 
means to follow a theological commitment 
referred to the salvific sense of the universe. A 
difference of a soteriological kind was pointed out 
by V. Lossky when he commented on the place of 
cosmology in the writings of the Fathers of the 
Church and, in particular, in the case if cosmology 
looses the sense of the centrality of humanity in 
the perspective of salvation, for example: “…
copernican cosmology, from a psychological or 
rather spiritual point of view, corresponds to a 
state of religious dispersion or off-centeredness, 
a relaxation of the soteriological attitude, such 
as found in the gnostics or the occult religions” 
(Lossky, 1957, p. 195). An example of such a 
dispersion and relaxation of the soteriological 
attitude can be found in modern “spirituality 
without God” according to which the immanence 
with the world going together with no belief at all 
(for there is nothing to believe in since everything 
is already here and now), despair (as no hope for 
anything since everything has already happened) 
correspond to that a human being is already 
there, in that reality, which theology names the 
age to come (Comte-Sponville, 2006). Thus, if 
the state of affairs is such as it is just described, 
the question of salvation as a personal spiritual 
endeavour, as an intensive anthropological 
transformation (metanoia) may be abandoned 
as irrelevant. One has everything which is 
given in its existential concreteness and all this 
represents an unsolvable mystery with which 
we have to live and die. In a certain sense, the 
immanent and infinite universe is treated as that 
realised “kingdom” of being in which everything 
is given and one does not need to enquire in the 
facticity of this givenness. It is at this point that 
the theological commitment, in contradistinction 
with the spirituality without God, aspires and 
breaks towards the transcendent, enquiring 
into the origins of being in the perspective of 
the human life and the sense of its coming into 
existence. Theological commitment revels itself 
as a concern with the sufficient conditions of the 
human existence, implying that life is not only 
a gift of existence, but a gift of relationship and 
communion with the eternal.
Thus, the delimiters in free thinking of 
the universe proceed in the long run from the 
freedom of human beings made in the image 
of God: all thoughts and articulations of the 
universe always contain the traces of the divine 
image in themselves. Even when cosmology 
proves the insignificance of humanity in the 
universe, the divine image remains exactly 
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because human mind always resists to all 
attempts to circumscribe its life in rubrics of the 
natural, finite and transient. Human beings aspire 
to understand the underlying sense of beings and 
things not according to their “nature” (which is 
unfolded in the sciences) but according to the 
final causes of these beings and things in relation 
to the place and goals of humanity in creation13. 
This understanding cannot be explicated only 
through physics and biology. It is based in views 
on humanity as the crown of creation made in the 
image of God. And this is the reason why in a 
God-like fashion humanity wants to recognise all 
sorts of beings (either simple physical objects or 
living organisms) not according to their nature 
that is according to their compelling givenness, 
but as results of humanity’s free will. The image 
of eternity is retained in any cosmological theory 
created through the free willing even if this 
theory predicts the finitude of all actual forms of 
existence and life. Free thinking of the universe 
is thinking of freedom of the incarnate human 
person, brought into being in the Divine image 
by the will of the Holy Spirit. 
Thus, the proposed methodology of 
studying the relationship between cosmology 
and theology results in unfolding of theological 
motives in humanity’s perception of existence 
in the universe, which, on the one hand, outlines 
human beings as its slaves, constantly “crushed 
by the ever increasing mass of the astronomical 
facts”, and which, on the other hand, manifests 
the sense of the human life in the universe by 
elevating it beyond the world order through 
a belief, hope and love in the perspective of 
eternity. This dichotomy between the infinitely 
small, finite physical existence and the feeling of 
the light of eternal life was felt by the Fathers of 
the Church and great mystical philosophers, as 
their personal vision of the darkness of hell and 
the light of the Spirit to both of which human 
beings are constantly turned and in the presence 
of which they must not only continue their life, 
fighting cosmic homelessness and despair, but 
also fight for the finding the sense of themselves 
and all creation. Theological commitment in 
cosmology is thus a characteristic expression of 
the visible and invisible universe as it appears 
to man in the perspective of communion, that is 
through the eyes and senses enlightened by the 
Divine presence. Whereas numerous books on 
cosmology discuss the role and place of humanity 
in the universe, our research brings the universe 
inside humanity, making the universe that mirror 
of its soul which humanity desperately wants to 
find. 
“Theological commitment”  
as a different form  
of the dialogue between theology  
and science
There is an element of socio-historical reality 
which sheds light on the reasons behind the 
proposed enquiry into the theological commitment 
in cosmology. First of all, cosmology always (in 
particular before its 20th century developments) 
was a part of theism. Cosmological arguments 
for the finitude or infinitude of the world in space 
and time were employed as different arguments 
for existence or non-existence of God. Theistic 
inferences are still alive and very popular among 
some philosophers and cosmologists who attempt 
to use cosmology in both apologetic and atheistic 
conclusions14. However, this dimension of the 
debate is not our primary concern, because the 
alternative of existence or non-existence of God 
is not an option for this research which takes 
an explicitly theistic stance (that is, theological 
commitment) on the grounds related to the 
facticity of human persons who are subjects of 
cosmological knowledge. Correspondingly we do 
not analyse cosmology from the perspective of an 
explicitly theistic stance based on some dogmatic 
propositions of God’s existence, rather we 
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proceed cautiously from what we call theological 
commitment as an existential, experiential mode 
of communion with God. 
Secondly, the topic of research is related 
to the dialogue between theology and science 
in general, which became a matter of scholarly 
discussions in the last 20-30 years. The question 
is: has this dialogue, in that form as it has been 
conducted, succeeded so far, that is, did it achieve 
any results which had impact on both science and 
theology? The author believes that the negative 
answer is provided by the unceasing scientific 
and technological advance (in particular in the 
exact natural sciences) which continues with 
no recourse to the dialogue between theology 
and science whatsoever. All discussions on 
whether science and theology are in conflict, or 
in “peaceful coexistence” with each other, do 
not have existential implications: the problem 
remains and its ongoing presence points to 
something which is basic and unavoidable in the 
very human condition. This net result indicates 
that the method of conducting this dialogue at 
present is unsatisfactory in the sense that it does 
not address the major question as to what is the 
underlying foundation in the very distinction, 
difference and division between science and 
religion as those modes of activity and knowledge 
which flourish from one and the same human 
subjectivity. But this type of questioning makes 
any scientific insight irrelevant simply because 
science is not capable of dealing with the 
question of its own facticity, that is the facticity 
of that consciousness which is the “pillar and 
ground” of science. Theology can respond to this 
question from within the explicitly belief-based 
ground, namely faith in that the knowledge of the 
world represents natural revelation accessible to 
humanity because of the God-given faculties. 
Knowledge is possible only by human persons 
whose basic qualities are freedom and capacity 
to retain transcendence with respect to all they 
assimilate through life and knowledge. In this 
sense, the universe as articulated reality has 
existence and sense only in a mode of personhood, 
which is a divine gift. Since science does not 
account for the very possibility of knowledge, 
that is personhood, it is automatically prevented 
from participation in the dialogue with theology 
on equal footing. It is logical then to express 
a doubt on the meaning and value of such an 
existing “dialogue” with science at all. If one 
insists on this “dialogue” it becomes obvious that 
science and theology cannot enter this dialogue 
as symmetric terms. And if there is no impact 
of this “dialogue” on logic and development of 
science, what remains for theology is to exercise 
an introspection upon science, to conduct a certain 
critique of science from a position which is, by 
definition, above and beyond not only scientific 
thinking, but secular thinking in general related 
to particular socio-historical and economic 
realities. Thus, symmetry between theology and 
science, theology and cosmology in particular, 
is broken from the very inception. It is this 
asymmetry that constitutes that approach to the 
science-religion discussions which we describe 
in terms of theological commitment. Theological 
commitment is such a stance on human being 
which always positions it above and beyond those 
realities which are disclosed by science alone. It 
appeals to those meanings of existence which 
do not compel the recognition of the science in 
the manner that natural phenomena do. These 
meanings originate in an innate quality of human 
beings to long for immortality, that is communion 
with the unconditional personal ground of the 
whole world, which humanity names God. And it 
is through this longing that the universe acquires 
a certain sense as that constituent of God’s 
creation which makes it possible for human 
persons to fulfil God’s promise for eternal life 
and communion. Theological commitment is 
thus existential commitment.
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Thirdly, theological commitment is the 
reaction to modern atheism. Indeed, in its goals 
and tasks the dialogue between Christianity and 
science is to oppose atheism. However, if one 
carefully looks at how this dialogue has been 
conducted so far, one easily realises that the 
existing forms of this dialogue are adapted to that 
which is imposed by atheism. Such a dialogue 
turns out to be no more than a reaction to atheism, 
sometimes attempting to unconvincingly justify 
the very fact of this reaction. Contemporary 
atheism manifests itself not only as freedom 
from historical authorities and tradition (that is 
the liberation from freedom in a Christian sense) 
and not only as the unprincipled following of the 
proclamation “enjoy life for there is no God”, that 
is not only as the worst form of the unenlightened 
slavery of the Plato’s cave in which the signs of 
the Divine presence are not recognised and the 
very ability to see them in the world is reduced to 
nothing. Atheism promotes a cult of immanence, 
the actually existent infinity of the given15, 
appealing de facto to deprivation of the senses 
and the vision of the transcendent (and hence to 
the relaxation of a soteriological moment). Since 
modern science, and technology in particular, 
encourage individuals to be transcendent-blind, 
creating the immanent images of the transcendent, 
the advocates of atheism appeal to science. By 
doing so atheism adjusts to the demands and 
moods of modern time. It is much easier not to 
deny the presence of the Divine in the world, but 
to claim that all spheres of the human activity are 
self-sufficient and do not need any reference to 
God. Since from a philosophical point of view 
the question of God’s existence or nonexistence 
cannot be decided at all (the philosophical mind 
remains in the “negative certitude” with respect 
to this question), then why should one try to 
answer it. Would it not be easier to recognise 
that science, art, literature etc. are just given in 
rubrics of that which is unconcealed to humanity. 
Here atheism reveals itself as secularism, as a 
kind of trans-ideological läicité , as a servility to 
nobody’s interests, and as a servility to the alleged 
ideal of humanity understood only empirically, as 
that humanity which is alive here and now16 (it is 
supposed that this ideal of humanity has in itself 
a universal criterion of its own definition). To 
define this humanity in simple categories which 
overcome racial national and class differences one 
needs a universal language. It is science which 
pretends to be such a language; to be more precise, 
it is that scientific form of thinking which reduces 
the phenomenon of humanity in all its various 
manifestations to the physical and biological. 
It is clear from here that modern atheism as a 
certain form of the “immanent humanism” is 
no more than a scientific atheism. However, this 
atheism positions itself as more aggressive17 and 
sinister, more advanced philosophically and anti-
theologically18 than was the case in the Soviet 
Russia. The reason for this is that modern atheism 
is ultimately motivated by the logic of material 
production and human resources, that is by the 
needs of the developing economies and not an 
abstract ideology19. 
The freedom from traditional and 
philosophical authorities as well as historical 
values inverts in modern atheism towards slavery 
to the scientifically articulated and verified. It is 
paradoxical, and fundamentally different from 
the Soviet model of atheism, that a slogan that 
“knowledge is power” is not appreciated in the 
economically advanced societies, for the all-
encompassing knowledge, that is knowing too 
much, is potentially socially dangerous. This 
entails in turn that knowledge and science both 
function in society in a reduced and popular form 
which does not allow one to judge of its certitude, 
quality and completeness. Scientific knowledge 
becomes a world-outlook, ideology and a filter 
of the social loyalty and adequacy. As a result 
the abuse of science becomes a norm which 
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creates an illusion of its efficiency and truth in all 
spheres of life. The scientific method is treated 
as self-sufficient and not being in need of any 
justification and evaluation. Science proclaims 
the truth of the world from its own rationality 
which functions in the disincarnate collective 
consciousness. Supported through the system of 
grants from the economically powerful group, 
it is allegedly done for the sake of human good. 
However by functioning in society science forgets 
about that simple truth that science is the human 
creation and its initial meaning was to guard the 
interests of people and not to make them slaves 
and hostages of the scientific method.
The situation with the dominance of the 
scientific approach to all aspects of life becomes 
even more paradoxical when one realises that 
human beings do not become more happy and free 
from the aspects of material existence. They cannot 
escape social injustice, hardship of mundane life, 
diseases and moral losses. This happens because 
science as an ideology does not spell out what 
is most important, namely that it does not know 
the goals and ways of its future development. 
In its grandeur science has to intentionally 
disregard those aspects of reality which are not 
described by it or which behave sporadically and 
unpredictably with respect to scientific prognosis. 
Economic growth and welfare of the developed 
nations which used to live in comfortable 
conditions, the cult of consumption and greed 
demand more technological development related 
to the exploitation of the natural resources. 
Every new discovery in physics is employed for 
the optimisation of the production of goods and 
energy, so that one can speak about merciless 
exploitation of the physical reality in general. It 
is very seldom that the question of the legitimacy 
and justification of such an exploitation, or, as 
some say, “rape of nature”20 is even thought of. By 
making nature an object of manipulation scientific 
consciousness forgets of its humanitarian duties 
in respect to nature: nature must be “respected” 
simply because we live in it and that there is the 
light of that all-embracing reason (Logos) which 
we, human beings, carry in ourselves as little 
logoi. The objects of nature are inseparable from 
their creator, so that the oblivion of this fact leads 
to the loss of love of them in the same sense as the 
loss of love to other people. A careful insight of 
a philosopher or a theologian will unmistakenly 
identify the root of the problem, namely that the 
atomisation, and disassemblement of the physical 
reality in course of its exploitation has it origin 
in the ethical individualism of those who know 
this reality, that is the loss of love to nature in 
the scientific community. The individualism 
consists in that the exploration and acquisition of 
physical reality becomes an affair of that human 
spirit which is divided in its narrow professional 
and corporative interests in which the element of 
catholicity with nature through the divine-given 
existence, is forgotten because love does not 
rule anymore for the interest of knowledge and 
longing for the perpetual good. 
The ambitions of the immanent secular 
reason, supported by the scientific achievements 
seem to be even more strange if one realises 
that modern science, in spite of its successes 
manifests the symptoms of a deep crisis related 
to the uncertainty of its goals. Scientific activity 
is purposive to the extent which accompanies 
any human activity. Any particular research has 
a concrete objective either to satisfy a practical 
interest or simply curiosity. However when we 
speak of the uncertainty of goals of science in 
general, we mean something different: scientific 
quest is spontaneous and is not related to the 
spiritual, infinite tasks of humanity. The practical 
purposiveness of scientific research thus unfolds 
only a particular sector of nature so that there 
remains a gap between that which has been 
known through a scientific phenomenalisation 
and that which cannot be known by science at all. 
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This fact manifests that nature has a propensity 
to remain concealed and react with respect 
to human experiments unpredictably. As an 
example, one can point to nuclear physics which, 
by acquiring the mysteries of the microworld 
and risks creating a state of matter which can 
threaten human existence on this planet21. There 
is a danger in nuclear experiments of trespassing 
the boundary of the unconcealed, related to 
human existence, when constructed devices and 
artificial states of matter may behave in a non-
human way, contradicting the initial objectives 
of experiments and turning science against 
humanity. A simple example from philosophical 
discussions of the 1950s is the atomic bomb 
which brought humanity to a new situation when 
the conditions of its existence are not controlled 
anymore only by the natural processes, but depend 
on the good will of people making decisions of 
using or not nuclear weapons, thus influencing 
global natural processes22. Another example is 
the ecological crisis. The melting polar cup of 
Greenland, extinction of some animal species 
and forthcoming migration of peoples living 
in the Arctic region show that technological 
applications of science escaping moral reason 
lead to the problem of the social and political 
order. Science through technology is not neutral 
anymore to economics and politics and, on the 
contrary, becomes their result and prophet. The 
process of exploration and knowledge of the 
surrounding world and thus its “transformation” 
becomes involved into the sphere of interests of 
the world’s powers and classes so that its ethical 
significance is determined by its belonging to this 
or that social-economic demand. That which has 
been said entails that scientific knowledge and the 
very idea that society can and must develop only 
on the basis of scientific progress becomes an 
ideological dogma, the following and defending 
of which in turn becomes a matter of social 
loyalty. However, without understanding its logic 
and definite goals, scientific progress, being de 
facto unavoidable and irreversible, carries in itself 
a potential danger because of the unpredictable 
nature of it applications. Human beings want 
to live better and longer; however this natural 
desire does not supply a clear understanding of 
the goals of science, whereas humanity becomes 
more and more dependent on its achievements 
and applications.
The fact that scientific advance leaves 
huge realms of being unexplored and unknown 
becomes even more evident in theoretical 
sciences, in particular in cosmology. On the one 
hand cosmology provides us with a comprehensive 
theory of the universe supported by observations. 
On the other hand it has to admit that those forms 
of matter in the universe which are physically 
understood constitute only 4 percent of its material 
content (the remaining 96 percent associated with 
the so called dark mass and dark energy remain 
by now beyond the reach of experiments; their 
existence is a matter of theoretical conviction). 
The more cosmology refines its scenario of the 
universe’s evolution, the more it realises the 
abyss of the physically unknown. Speaking 
philosophically, cosmology makes clearly seen 
the boundaries of the unconcealed which is related 
to humanity: it is only 4 percent of mater in the 
universe which can be said to be consubstantial to 
human physical and biological form. Amazingly, 
however, that in spite of all evidence for the 
limited nature of our knowledge of the universe, 
cosmologists sometimes position themselves as 
“prophets and priests” of the universe, preaching 
of it as if they know the absolute truth of the world. 
Such a conviction with respect to knowledge of 
the universe originates in a naïve representation 
of the universe as a whole as an “object” whose 
phenomenality can be exhausted through the 
logic of scientific signifiers. 
One of the major attributes of modern 
science which makes it powerful is its radical 
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mathematization of nature. Physics and 
cosmology, through mathematical models and 
theories, predicate realities inaccessible in 
direct experiments. There is a paradoxical shift 
of representations of reality here: unobservable 
intelligible entities are treated as more fundamental 
and responsible for the contingent display of visible 
nature. As we argued elsewhere mathematization 
of nature is accompanied by the diminution of 
humanity, in particular the personal dimension 
of existence (see Nesteruk 2008, pp. 188-205). 
Person disappears from scientific discourse 
in spite of the fact that all articulated facts are 
made by persons. Science is being effected in the 
name of human persons, but this same person 
turns out to be outside of scientific description. 
Persons are needed for the anonymous objectives 
of science to disclose reality, but they do not exist 
for science as agencies of other non-scientific 
truths and individual lives. Science as a social 
process needs scientific workers but not persons 
as unique and unrepeatable events of disclosure 
of the universe. The same is true with respect to 
society which needs not persons but masses of 
individuals which are much easier adapted to the 
norms of materialistic thinking and behaviourist 
stereotypes based in the criteria of consumption 
of the results of technological progress. Modern 
atheism exploits this aspect of modern science by 
insisting on effective non-existence of personhood 
as a philosophical and theological notion. The 
oblivion of the person is treated by Christian 
theology as an encroachment on the absolute 
priority of the human world and those communal 
links in human societies which have formed the 
spirit of the Christian civilisation and integrity of 
its historical paths through communion with God. 
The oblivion of the person is the encroachment on 
the historical significance of its history impressed 
in the architectural image of European cities, 
masterpieces of art and literature, in the very 
way of European thinking and its values. The 
oblivion of the person constitutes an attack on all 
traditional forms of societies and life, which by 
the logic of the economical must cease to exist or 
become unobservable.
To defend the person and to reinstate it to its 
central status in the dialogue between theology 
and cosmology becomes a leading motive of the 
theological commitment. To reinstate the person 
means to understand that the problem of theology 
and science manifests the basic distinction and 
division of two attitudes to life in one and the same 
human person. The dialogue between theology 
and science becomes the explication the split 
between intentionalities which the human spirit 
attempts to reconcile. This, by using the language 
of Husserl, forms one of the infinite tasks of 
the human spirit to understand the meaning of 
existence. The very fact that this dialogue exists 
attests that human beings transcend the conditions 
of their physic-biological existence, the self-
realisation of a special place in the universe in 
which the function of the Divine image in man 
is realised (Berdyaev, 1944, p. 94). Thus, the 
fact of the dialogue attests also to that it contains 
the elements of transcendence and asymmetry 
between theology and science related to the 
human condition which is called personhood. 
It is this asymmetry, articulated in reflection, 
which we call the theological commitment, by 
confirming once again that this is an existential 
commitment. Correspondingly it seems doubtful 
that the dialogue between Christian theology 
and cosmology is possible without faith that both 
theology and cosmology represent modalities 
of the relationship between humanity and the 
Divine. 
Theological commitment  
as a form of critique of secular science
Contemporary science is historically rooted 
in the so called modernity (sometime historically 
associated with the fall of Constantinople in 1453) 
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which has been responsible for dualisms such 
as the opposition between faith and reason, the 
dualisms which formed the grounds for excluding 
the divine and transcendent. It is modernity which 
is responsible for the claim that truth is based on 
universal reason, which tells us what reality is 
like. In this historical setting theology (as a way 
of life) was forced in the dialogue with science 
following the rules of modernity but not its own 
intrinsic logic of communion with God. These 
rules effectively dictated that theology entered the 
dialogue between faith and reason along the lines 
of adopted secular standards of scientific truth 
or normative rationality assuming a particular 
notion of the knowing subject (as impersonal 
and disembodied collective subjectivity) which 
is sharply opposed to the theological way of 
asserting truth through events of incarnate 
hypostatic lives. Seen theologically the secular 
standards of affirming truth are themselves 
based in certain myths and beliefs (for example 
in the existence of a universal human reason) 
so that they can affirm objective values only 
precariously. One of the dimensions of the modern 
dialogue between science and theology is exactly 
to put modernity’s claim for the universality of 
truth under question (at least in what concerns 
the human sciences, including philosophy and 
theology), asserting that the modernity’s ways of 
appropriation of truth were in a certain deviation 
from the unified vision of the world which was 
based in the characteristic alliance between faith 
and knowledge both originating in communion 
with God. 
Modernity can be characterised as a change 
in the very way of questioning of God. According 
to the Christian biblical thinking the question 
never was formulated as “Whether I must believe 
in God?” and hence “Does God exist?” For a 
Christian the main question was a biblical one: 
“Who is that God whom I must trust?” There 
is a fundamental difference between belief in 
existence of God and trust to God. The God of 
the Bible requires from one much more than 
a recognition on the level of fact or theory of 
its existence. It demands from us “existential 
commitment” and entrusting our lives in God’s 
care. This does not mean a lack of a rational 
element in such understanding of faith and 
trust. In early Christianity one can meet rational 
arguments in favour of the existence of God. It is 
enough to mention St. Athanasius of Alexandria, 
who pointed out that one can deduce the existence 
of God from observing the order and harmony 
in the world23. One must remember, however, 
that these arguments were aimed at Christians, 
that is to those who believed in God in order to 
reveal a rational element within Christian faith24. 
Rationality in faith aids one in elucidating the 
sense of this faith as faith in God, but not as belief 
in happiness and pleasures of life, for example. 
Correspondingly knowledge as such does not lead 
us immediately to knowledge of the Divine, for 
the Divine participation in us is not an object of 
direct “observation” or intuition, but is revealed 
only through a rational reflection25.
It is probably only starting from Descartes in 
the 17th century that arguments on the existence 
of God become to be used in order to convince 
sceptics that God indeed exists. The intellectuals 
in Western Europe started to follow a view that 
religious beliefs are based, first of all, in rational 
convictions. This view corresponded to the rise 
of knowledge rooted in empirical justification 
and “scientific method.” The arguments for the 
existence of God, beginning from the times 
of modernity, based on the logic of scientific 
demonstration, became the only legitimate 
foundation for faith in God at all. Divine 
revelation and personal experience were not 
considered anymore as a responsible judgement. 
The witness of the Scriptures was accepted only 
after the rationality of such an evidence was 
established through other independent methods. 
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One can notice here how an increasing wave 
of secular thinking detached from faith began 
to impose its standards in the realm of faith. 
Secularism meant not simply that in arguments 
related to faith one must use reason, but that this 
reason is independent from faith and immanent to 
logic and laws of this world, being thus the only 
measure of all human activity, so that faith in 
God and religious experience acquired any sense 
only from within this reason. 
By criticising faith for its unconvincing 
arguments and accusing it of being subjective 
and related to the overcoming of existential 
anxieties, “modernity” with its scientific method 
falls into another extreme: by assigning to 
reason disembodied universality, the discourse 
of humanity is thus being thrown away from 
the sphere of reason. Science becomes such a 
world-outlook which deals not with concrete 
human beings (with their immediate concerns, 
history and life), but as an indefinite and abstract, 
anonymous and non-empirical structure in being 
which “controls” every particular embodied 
creature. Nobody argues against the efficiency 
and importance of science in modern world, 
but it must be remembered that the adoption 
of the scientific method, in fact, manifests 
a certain belief in efficiency and existential 
importance of the anonymous and disincarnate 
way of knowledge in opposition to other forms of 
experience and views of the sense of the human. 
By decentring the cosmos, that is removing it 
from the sphere of the personal standing “in 
front of” (as an aesthetical category) and making 
it an extensional arena of blind physical forces 
(that is making it an object), human beings make 
a preference for a different mythology whose 
existential meaning is reduced to a simple desire 
to doom itself in the meaningless and contingent 
non-purposiveness in the universe, that is to be 
dissolved in the “cosmic homelessness”. It is this 
decentring of the cosmos which is disclosed from 
within the theological commitment as based in 
a philosophical belief in the very possibility of 
such a decentring. Since this philosophical belief 
is not demonstrable from the ways of science 
itself, its very application remains no more than 
an empirical and contingent fact which points 
toward the contingent facticity of that world-
picture which is built upon it. Correspondingly 
all judgements of the scientific method on the 
possibility or impossibility of making inference 
on the trans-worldly foundation of the universe 
remain only precarious. 
Modernity’s stance on knowledge is seen as a 
certain deviation from the unified and spiritually 
universal approach to knowing reality which 
existed in late antiquity and Middle ages. Science 
or, more precisely knowledge (episteme), received 
its interpretation by theology which elucidated 
the sense of knowledge and the foundations of its 
contingent facticity. Knowledge understood by 
modernity excluded communion, that is the living 
participation and ontological relation with that 
which is being known (this relation, by using the 
language of Heidegger, one could interpret, on the 
one hand, as letting human essence be controlled 
by the circle of the unconcealed, and, on the 
other hand, for human beings to be able to remain 
concealed in relation to this circle, retaining 
its hypostatic, irreducible to nature qualities). 
Correspondingly the truth of such knowledge was 
limited to individual comprehension and to the 
correspondence of thought to its object (veritas est 
adaequatio rei et intellectus). Ratio, understood 
as a reduced and transformed version of logos of 
Greek Patristics, corresponded to the transition 
from the epistemic priority of communion to the 
priority of the individualised rational concept. 
The subject of logic and knowledge of modernity 
acquired a new qualitative feature of being able to 
wander at large over reality without being aware 
of its own fundamental otherness with respect to 
it, that otherness which, nevertheless, allows one 
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to enter relation with reality and interpret it as 
words imbued with energy (logoi). The distortion 
of the sense of logos, understood as knowledge 
through communion lies in the foundation of all 
standards of thought which ultimately originated 
in Scholastics (and later in Descartes) and that 
was a considerable deviation from Christian 
theology of the late antiquity and Middle ages26. 
The change of view on knowledge as originating 
not in a hypostasis but in an individual was a 
certain distortion of anthropology in favour 
of psychological individualism and also the 
evaluation of a human subject on the basis of the 
juridical criteria27. As a result, the understanding 
of objectivity, corresponding to this change, 
as being devoid of the living communion and 
based on the realities of the law-like order, led 
to the formation of the scientific and technical 
civilisation and methods of knowledge rooted in 
utilitarian principles related to the social rights 
and goals. 
Whereas Western theology had to adapt 
to the demands of modernity and hence accept 
secular norms in its arguments on the presence 
of the Divine in the world and it interaction with 
the sciences, the theology of the Eastern Church 
retained “pre-modern” experience of seeing 
sciences and knowledge without adapting to 
the secularism of modernity. It is because of 
this that Christian theology, in particular in 
its Eastern Orthodox form, being faithful to 
the tradition of life in communion with God 
dogmatically and liturgically, thus transcending 
all historical divisions, feels empowered to 
question the foundational premises of modern 
science and the ways how its dialogue with 
theology is organised28. Since modernity is seen 
by the Eastern Orthodox as a certain deviation 
from the view that any knowledge contains a 
deposit of faith (let it be simple existential 
faith), Christian theology is given the right to 
use the language and critical methods developed 
within modern and postmodern philosophy, 
and other human sciences, in order to explicate 
those “faith-like commitments” which underlie 
modern science with its claims for truth and 
hence the imposed form of its dialogue with 
theology. If scientific claims for truth will be 
seen as endowed with the certainty of belief, 
the dialogue between theology and science 
will rise to a different level, namely that the 
distinction and difference between theology 
and science will be seen as the differentiation of 
intentionalities and constituents of one and the 
same human subjectivity. In this the dialogue 
between theology and science will acquire 
features of a phenomenological project where 
phenomenology is employed as a particular 
method in exercising a critical function of 
theological commitment. In different words, 
the discourse seen through the theological 
commitment cannot avoid phenomenology as a 
method of explication of this commitment. 
The appearance of phenomenology in 
a theological discourse shows once again 
that theology in the mode of operation by 
reason is a form of critical thinking, because 
phenomenology is itself a mode of operation 
of critical thinking. The sphere of operation of 
theological critical thinking is in all realms where 
the Church (ecclesial humanity) meets historical 
and cultural reality. Theology creatively and 
critically thinks of any emerging historical 
problem or scientific theme, while remaining 
in the immutable state of the Church’s spiritual 
life, because this life is experience of God, that 
is, of eternity29. Thus theology always functions 
from above mass-religious consciousness, as 
well as “secular” scientific consciousness which 
claims its freedom from any faith commitments; 
theology’s unceasing task is to provide a constant 
and constructive critique of these modes of 
consciousness by referring them to the original 
divine image in humanity. 
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In doing the above critique theology asserts 
itself as a meta-discourse, that is, as that form 
of critical thinking about different modalities 
of social activity, including a scientific one, 
which expresses the Divine presence and action, 
and which is not being bounded or exploited 
by some other particular human activities 
as their “prophetic” voice, be it the socio-
historical sciences or a kind of all-encompassing 
transcendental philosophy. The critical function 
of theology with respect to other discourses 
never allows theology to slip into such a position 
that its scope and place will be determined by 
other discourses, for example by the science-
religion dialogue as such. In this sense theology 
can never be defined and positioned by secular 
reason and thus it does not accept the idea of a 
complete autonomy of that sphere of the worldly 
reality which is asserted through rational, that is 
scientific, understanding30. 
One must take into account that by 
promoting theology to be a critical thinking we 
imply that this theology is in ecclesial setting, 
that is its inseparability from experience of God 
through historical tradition, liturgy and other 
forms of communion. This entails that by being 
critical with respect to various forms of thought 
theology represents the voice of the Church as 
that “place” in the universe where God meets 
humanity. This implies in turn that in order to 
remain critical and encompassing with respect 
to other discourses, the Church must remain 
independent in its voice and not to be easily 
adapted to the requirements of the secular reason, 
and, in particular, to the demands of the dialogue 
with science31. If this were not to be the case and 
secular reason uncritically claimed its right for 
neutrality, objectivity and independence from 
any faith commitments, faith and reason would 
remain parallel and non-intersecting in this 
age32. But the separation of faith and reason is 
the consequence of many other divisions in one 
and the same subjectivity, and this separation in 
turn divides, in this subjectivity, the Divine and 
the created. It is this very division (Gr. diairesis), 
which St. Maximus the Confessor described as 
the moral tension between the Creator and the 
created, and whose alleviation is the ultimate 
goal of the human accomplishment of the Divine 
likeness33. If the tension between faith and reason 
is sought to be overcome, it is clear that it can be 
done only within a strong faith-commitment, and 
secular reason alone is incapable of attempting 
this mediation in a non-totalitarian and non-
reductive way. However, if theology submits itself 
to the logic of the secular (for example, assuming 
a scientific form) it would become one particular, 
although very special, mode of activity separated 
from other modalities of human reality which do 
not fit in the rubrics of secular demands34. As 
an example, following the logic of the secular, 
theology has to deal with the issue of biological 
evolution and origin of humanity which, in the 
perspective of science, accentuates the physical 
and biological, that is corporeal and hence 
collective. But no theory of evolution can literally 
say anything about the origin of hypostatic human 
subjectivity, that is of persons who articulate this 
same evolution as such. It is persons who have 
empathy and love, who can rejoice and suffer, 
but whose account is impossible in science. 
Theology, in contradistinction with science, is an 
existential enterprise never abstracting from the 
concreteness of the human person and its desire 
to attain immortality. Theology as experience 
of communion with the invisible origin of all is 
life, so that it encompasses all reality in which 
humanity is present not only physically (through 
the senses and discursive cognitive faculties), 
but through insight (Kant would say judgement); 
thus it is intrinsically present in all disclosures 
and manifestations of reality by human beings, 
so that all reality’s articulations are referred to 
and judged by the theological modality of life.
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The theological commitment in the dialogue 
with science means the radical stance on science 
following from the objective requirement that 
ecclesial theology must draw a clear borderline 
between the dispassionate contemplation of what 
happens in modern science and its involvement in 
it35. The criteria of delimiters can be set in words 
of Jesus Christ: “What does anyone gain by 
winning the whole world at the cost of destroying 
himself?”(Lk. 9:25; Cf. Matt. 16:26). In modern 
terms it would sound like this: “What does 
humankind gain by exploring and subjecting the 
world to its curiosity and utilitarian needs at the 
cost of loosing the sense of integrity of existence 
and the vision of humanity’s infinite tasks and 
spiritual goals as linked to the transcendent?” 
Theology must not, it has no right to be involved 
in those movements of a new nihilistic spirit 
originating, in fact, from the modern apology 
for atheism which dare address to modern men 
the questions like this: What is the point of 
the humanity of humans, the naturalness of 
nature, the justice of the polis, and the truth of 
knowledge? Why not rather their opposites, the 
dehumanization of humans to improve humanity, 
the systematic raping of nature to develop the 
economy, injustice to keep society more efficient, 
the vast ocean of distracting and existentially 
irrelevant information to escape the commitment 
to truth? Since these counter-possibilities are 
no longer just a hypothetical speculation but 
nearly the sole program of the ideologies that 
have dominated in history since the beginning 
of the 20th century, the Church and all those for 
whom the humanity of humans, the naturalness 
of nature, the justice of the polis, and the truth of 
knowledge remain absolute values, must have a 
decisive and radical response to it by conducting 
the systematic critique of those forms of secular 
(and scientifically based) thinking which 
encourages mass-consciousness to the “winning” 
the autonomous scientific part of the world at the 
cost of destroying communion with the whole. 
However, its theological radical critique of the 
scientifically asserted world does not preclude this 
same theology from being radically positive with 
respect to science and the world. What Orthodox 
theology judges is the alleged autonomy and 
independence of the scientific view of the world 
from the very intricate inherence in the human and 
hence in the Divine (c.f. Nellas, 1997, pp. 93-104). 
The positive judgement of science and the world 
originates from the sanctification which existential 
ecclesial theology undertakes by bringing all 
fruits of human labour, including science and its 
picture of the world, to the their correct operation 
in the wholeness of communion. 
Here not only a dispassionate critique of a 
scientific secular mode of thinking is implied. 
The Christian imperative calls into question the 
ethical value of the pure secular science with its 
pretence to objectivity and neutrality and its claim 
for the truth of being, as if it is devoid of any faith 
assumptions and possibility of transcendence. 
It calls into question some gnostic ambitions 
of modern science to be the power which helps 
people to solve problems of physical survival. 
In these pretensions modern science denies not 
only theology’s right to predicate reality, but it 
denies also philosophy (as love of wisdom) for 
the uncertainty of its judgements (certitudes 
négatives). The scientific secular mind aspires 
not to philosophy, but to gnosis, that is, precise 
and demonstrable knowledge. Its aim is to justify 
the thesis that one must keep silent about that 
which cannot be spoken in terms of the rubrics 
of reason. Theological commitment advocates 
the opposite in a sophisticated, apophatic, sense: 
one has no right to keep silent about things of 
which we cannot speak (using pure reason), for 
in this case we pass over in silence the essence 
of our existence. Yet one can talk about ultimate 
existential things only through metaphors and 
aberrations in being clear that the fullness of 
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essential questions cannot be exhausted by 
the faculties of reason. When the precision of 
judgement becomes an absolute value so that 
all questions beyond this “precise gnosis” are 
abandoned, human being feels lost and deprived 
of its own existential anxieties. In this sense faith 
implied in the theological commitment never 
threatens science and philosophy: on the contrary 
it protects them from the all-pervasive pretensions 
of gnosis (and, as a result, from atheism and soul-
corroding nihilism) (c.f. Ratzinger 1993, s. 40). 
Theology based in faith, being all inclusive, 
needs both philosophy and science because 
faith operates in the conditions of the incarnate 
humanity which seeks and asks for truth. Faith 
has its duty with respect to reason36 but it still 
remains critical with respect to both philosophy 
and science. 
There must be, however, made a comment 
on the sense of our usage of the word “critique” 
if it applied by theology with respect to secular 
thinking, including science. In fact, there must be 
made a distinction between our sense of “critique” 
and atheistic criticism of theology based on the 
grounds of the so called “critical rationalism”. 
Briefly, the essence of this philosophical trend 
descending from K. Popper, and being first of 
all represented by H. Albert37, consists in appeal 
to constant understanding and revaluation of 
the achieved landmarks of knowledge, revising 
and amending all empirical results as well as 
intellectual constructs. This strategy of research 
and seeking for truth is treated as to be genuinely 
rational. Correspondingly the attitude of the 
atheistically oriented representatives of this 
“critical rationalism” is to criticise religion, and 
Christianity in particular, for being dogmatic 
and using the “ strategy of immunisation” from 
any criticism with respect to basic dogmas of 
faith. This concerns first of all of the central 
theological conviction of existence of God. Since 
no rational demonstration of such an existence 
is possible, so that any possible statements 
about God can be doubted and hence criticised, 
theology immunizes this aspect of faith from 
any rational critique and thus it falls into the 
fallacy of dogmatism, that is an arbitrary chosen 
premise for any further deductions. In view of 
these accusations, our main concern here is the 
following: if the followers of “critical rationalism” 
charge religion and theology with dogmatism 
and irrationalism, how can theology, according 
to our view, be a universal tool for criticising 
secular thinking and science? How it is possible 
that behind the alleged irrationality of theology 
there is something which makes it “rational” in 
the sense of being able to oversee and justify all 
discourse based on the rationality of reason. In 
other words, could theology respond to “critical 
rationalism” through its critique? The answer 
to this question is already present in history of 
thought and it further explication could form a 
separate research on science and religion38. Here 
we would just like to provide a very brief response, 
related to our claim that theology is destined to 
exercise critique of secular thinking.
Any philosophical strategy with respect to 
science, including that of “critical rationalism” 
leaves one basic question unanswered despite 
a continuing criticism and revision of scientific 
views of the world. This question is about the very 
facticity, that is the very possibility of scientific 
advance which allegedly goes along the lines of 
“critical rationality”. As we mentioned above this 
advance and “critical rationality”, acting upon 
it, does not understand its sense and its goal. Its 
telos, if it is somehow envisaged, must, from the 
point of view of critical rationalists be corrigible 
and amendable, that is contingent and historically 
adjustable. But such a critical approach to the 
ways of human knowledge as part of life leaves 
humanity with the state of despair, cosmic 
homelessness and non-attunement to the universe 
which have been mentioned before. Theology in 
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this sense provides human search for truth with 
teleology in the sense of orientation, recourse 
to what is solidly exist and to the sense of what 
human life is about in the perspective of eternity. 
It breathes a meaning into the disenchanted 
world so that human beings no longer suffer from 
being mere spectators staring at the universe’s 
emptiness. A critical function of theology is to 
override any form of mundane criticism based 
on scientific rationality and to extract out of this 
criticism an ultimate positive core of the human 
existence in the perspective of the promise of 
salvation. To overcome the critique of theology 
from the side of critical realists, this theology 
must establish critique of the critique. Thus it must 
transcend in the name of restoring the home place 
for humanity. Theology and theologians cannot 
permit anyone to prevent them from advocating 
and defending the humanity of the humans, 
naturalness of nature, justice of the police. Any 
cosmological theory with its advance of corrigible 
findings and mind-boggling discoveries must be 
subjected to an existential and hence theological 
critique: the divine image of humanity must be 
preserved even if this cosmology “crushes man 
under the weight of the astronomical facts.” 
Theological commitment  
in a phenomenological modality:  
the centrality of person
In its intrinsic critical function upon all 
social undertakings theology manifests itself 
in a phenomenological modality, that modality 
which studies, analyses and qualifies states 
of human consciousness by referring them to 
their ultimate source in persons who inhere 
their image in the Divine. Theology deals with 
phenomena, in human consciousness, of the 
presence of God, so that in this sense theology is 
the domain of phenomenology. However unlike 
classical philosophical phenomenology which 
fights against transcendence, ecclesial theology 
assumes the possibility of transcendence in its 
stance on humanity which, belonging to this 
world and articulating it, does not allow this world 
to swallow and reduce humanity to nothing. Here 
transcendence means the ability of human persons 
to preserve their otherness with respect to the 
universe even when this universe is effectively 
humanised through human articulation. However 
this otherness, understood theologically, if it is 
realised and preserved, and if it is developed and 
extended through the articulation of the universe, 
contributes to the growth of religious faith. Thus 
theological commitment in cosmology, as the 
movement “beyond secular reason”, implies, 
through bringing personhood to its God-given 
centrality in being, the deepening and acquiring 
new experience of God which is manifested in 
new forms of thought and philosophical language. 
If cosmology considers itself as self-generating 
knowledge in which God-given centrality of 
humanity is lost or distorted, human thinking of 
the universe and of its own position in it becomes 
imbued with the existentially irrational, the 
sense of homelessness, not being attuned with 
and incommensurable to the universe, leading to 
what Marcel described as the “crushing of man 
under the weight of astronomical facts”, that is to 
death which strips all sense and value of human 
life. Seen in this perspective any cosmology, if 
it looses commitment to existential faith (not 
mentioning at all its Christian sense), that is, if it 
does not promote human life on this planet, can 
become a spiritually damaging practice, where 
the boundary between the human and inhuman 
in the universe can be trespassed and the sense of 
life is lost. All this means that the explication of 
theological commitment in cosmology implies the 
work of the spiritually enlightened reason with 
the aim to explicate persons and their communal 
affinity to the Divine.
By using phenomenology as a methodological 
tool in explicating theological commitment we 
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assume its extension beyond its “classical” sphere 
associated with Husserl and his followers39. From 
a philosophical point of view the extension of 
phenomenology towards theology (a so called 
“theological turn”) is not unproblematic (Janicaud 
1990) since it deviates from the initial objectives 
of phenomenology which was fighting against 
transcendence and made a methodological 
doubt of God through a phenomenological 
reduction (Husserl 1998, § 58). The question 
is: do phenomena associated with the presence 
of the Divine retain in them something which 
does not exhaust them and does not allow their 
complete acquisition by consciousness?40 Such 
phenomena change the classical philosophical 
stance on the a-priori character of the cognitive 
faculties and the ability to constitute phenomena 
as phenomena of consciousness. Theology 
benefits from such a philosophical discussion 
because theology, having had duties with respect 
to reason, can be theoretically advanced for the 
dialogue with science to become more articulated 
in modern philosophical, linguistic and semantic 
formulae. This, in a way, constitutes a patristic 
ideal; correspondingly being in the same tradition 
contemporary theology should learn from the 
early theologians how to conduct a dialogue 
with science and philosophy by employing 
contemporary philosophical thought. In reference 
to the practices of the Fathers this constitutes 
a neo-patristic dimension of the dialogue of 
theology with science41 as another dimension 
of theological commitment. Correspondingly 
the explication of the theological commitment 
in cosmology becomes a contribution to this 
synthesis as the extension of old forms of thought 
and existential meanings towards our age. 
The theological commitment in cosmology 
implies a certain stance on anthropology, or 
personhood. It sees the split between faith and 
reason, or the split of intentionalities in one and the 
same human subjectivity, as the loss of centrality 
of human person in the dialogue. Correspondingly 
it is because of the advance of technology and 
science, which diminishes a personal dimension 
of existence, there is a growing concern about the 
respect of human dignity and freedom in our time. 
Humanity, understood theologically as events 
of hypostatic existence, manifests the living 
transcendence (through communion) and thus the 
possibility of reaching out to the transcendent, 
as that personal rationality through communion 
with which the world receives its meaning as 
the means of the dialogue between humanity 
and God. The dialogue between Christian 
theology and science becomes a radical form of 
the intellectual, cultural and spiritual mediation 
among all splits and disintegrations in human life. 
It demonstrates that there is a common ground for 
all humanity in otherness of God, as well as in 
consubstantiality with the universe. This position 
confirms an old patristic view that theology 
is a mode of life and the essence of the human 
condition is communion with the divine. Within 
this perspective the dialogue between theology 
and science rejects either the dominance of pure 
faith or pure reason, for it considers both of them 
within the integrity of hypostatic humanity as 
two modes of participation in the divine.42 At the 
same time it does not want to consider theology 
as a dialect enclosed in itself and unrelated to 
other spheres of human reason, although it never 
adapts to any unquestioned norms of the secular 
reason43.
In a phenomenological perspective the 
problem of mediation between theology and 
science can be formulated as the reconciliation of 
the two types of experience in one and the same 
human subjectivity. On the one hand, in science, 
this experience is empirical and theoretical, 
delivering to human subjectivity knowledge 
of things “present in their presence”. This is 
achieved by the fact that all phenomena related 
to the outside world are constituted within the 
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immanence of the ego. Regardless as to whether 
one means empirical observations and controllable 
measurements, or mathematical statements, 
what is evident is that in all these cases the 
“reality of the outer world” is affirmed through 
the structures of the constituting subjectivity. 
On the one hand consciousness poses scientific 
phenomena outside itself making them objects , as 
if they exist separately and independently of the 
subject; on the other hand the form of the content 
of these phenomena is generated by the human 
subjectivity so that the form of these phenomena 
is immanent to human consciousness. Thus, the 
transcending tendencies in scientific knowledge 
are present in the very foundation of its natural 
attitude, whereas phenomenology attempts to 
clarify the sense of this transcendence by referring 
the to the subjective pole of knowledge. Scientific 
phenomena, articulated as certain transcendences 
of the sphere of subjectivity, can be represented 
discursively as objects that manifest themselves as 
being poor in terms of their intuitive content, that 
content which forms an invisible and silent context 
of that objective reality which appears through the 
procedures of science. In other words, by making 
phenomena objective in a scientific sense, what 
is left behind is the intuitive content of the life of 
consciousness which cannot be phenomenalised 
at all; thus human subjectivity cannot be reduced 
to that which is phenomenalised; hence there 
is something in this subjectivity – its personal, 
hypostatic centre – which passes over any 
scientific presentation of life. Thus, human persons 
transcend the scientifically organised universe in 
a very sophisticated sense: even if cosmology 
asserts human existence as insignificant, it 
cannot remove the intuitive content of the trans-
worldly dimension which pertains to human 
persons as divine-made agencies. Thus, when the 
scientific mind poses physical reality as objective 
and independent of human insight, it is not as if 
human history has been “cosmosized”, that is 
placed in the cosmic context, being reduced to 
the necessities of substances and the laws of the 
universe. It is completely opposite: the universe 
is being humanized, becoming the content and 
structure of the human subjectivity as part of the 
unfolding human history. The universe becomes 
immanent to humanity whereas humanity retains 
its transcendence to it. In spite of the fact that 
this transcendence is always in place and is the 
motivating force of any scientific enquiry, which 
never stops because science never abolishes the 
freedom of humanity to progress beyond the 
already achieved, it is this very science which 
cannot give an account for the ground of this 
transcendence because it does not account for 
persons. The dissatisfaction of science by its 
inability to account for the contingent facticity 
of personhood leads, in a paradoxical way, to its 
fight against transcendence as the retaining of 
those foundational intuitive existential contexts 
which make possible any scientific articulation. 
Theology exhibits a clear difference with 
science: it claims that it is possible to accept the 
phenomena of the divine as absolute, unconditioned 
by thought or speech, that is to retain as “present 
in absence” that which is beyond the expression 
of what is given or revealed, that is beyond of 
that which can be phenomenalised. On the one 
hand, the phenomena of the divine are immanent 
because they belong to human experience, on the 
other hand they are transcendent because they 
cannot be phenomenalised within the rubrics of 
pure thought and language because of its inability 
to exhaust by means of signifiers that which it is 
supposed to signify. One can say that theology 
retains transcendence in immanence. Here 
classical phenomenology, with its philosophical 
respect for immanence, enters an irresolvable 
conflict with theology. According to classical 
phenomenology the phenomenality of God, 
as well as the underlying facticity of science, 
would be forbidden, insofar as they re-establish 
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transcendence as opposed to the reduction which 
attempts to neutralise it. Science is not subjected 
to this problem to the same extent because the 
scientific discourse does not attempt to see 
the “other” side of physical phenomena, that 
side which is responsible for their contingent 
facticity. In science human subjectivity operates 
in the natural attitude by affirming objects of the 
universe as existing outside and independently 
of this subjectivity. However, the facticity of 
that givenness of objects of physics, that is their 
articulated phenomenality, lies in that same 
subjectivity which attempts to be abstracted 
from them. If in theology the problem of the 
phenomenalisation of the divine coincides with 
the problem of theology’s facticity, in science 
the obvious phenomenalisation of the finite 
things and events does not naturally bring human 
subjectivity to an enquiry about the facticity 
of science which explicates these phenomena. 
Science can effectively function within the 
sphere of immanence of that subjectivity which 
generates it, remaining merely an efficient tool, 
the very possibility of which remains obscure 
(Gurwitsch, 1966, pp. 399-400). 
Then a reasonable question arises with 
respect to the dialogue between theology and 
science: what is really meant by the dialogue 
between theology, which implies transcendence 
in its very definition, and science, whose monism, 
as immanentism, is implanted in scientific 
methodology so that transcendence is precluded? 
The situation is aggravated by the fact that 
transcendence is not self-evident even in theology 
if it is taken in a purely philosophical mode. That 
philosophical theology which considers God 
in terms of existence and real transcendence, 
causality and substance, is subject to a 
phenomenological critique: God is disqualified 
from being a phenomenon. In contradistinction 
to this, the theology of experience is based on 
facts and manifestations linked to the Scriptures 
and Eucharistic communion and here we deal 
with such phenomena which render a sort of 
concealment, not being fully disclosed through 
those aspects of intuition which cascade towards 
expression. In other words, theology understood 
as experience deals with phenomena which are 
pre-theoretical. Hence there is a general problem 
of how to express theoretically, pre-theoretical 
experience; for example, how to employ thought 
and speech in order to express that which, by 
intuition, cannot be thought and spoken of, that is, 
that which exceeds the limits of the constituting 
ego. In other words, how is it possible to retain 
the transcendence of God while speaking and 
thinking of him within the immanence of human 
subjectivity? Evidently, a similar question must 
be formulated with respect to the universe: 
how to retain the transcendence of the universe 
as a whole while speaking and thinking of its 
observable and non-observable parts within the 
immanent subjectivity. 
The Greek patristic response to such 
questions would be that knowledge of God cannot 
be exhausted by reason and its linguistic means; 
theology operates with metaphors and allegories 
which, however, reflect existential, precategorical 
and pretheoretical truth. The challenge to 
philosophical theology, which appropriates 
existential truth of God within the limits of reason, 
is to overcome the phenomenalisation of the 
transcendent and thus to preserve transcendence 
in immanence. In different words, theology has 
to deal with the intrinsic ambivalence of the 
givenness of the divine, that is, with its “presence 
but in absence”. If theology, being scrutinised by 
philosophical thought, is in need of justification 
of its own ability to retain transcendence within 
the sphere of phenomenality of consciousness, 
cosmology, if it intends to engage with religion, 
needs a similar sort of justification but to a much 
wider extent. This implies that the problem of 
mediation between theology and cosmology 
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requires one to deal with a generic issue of the 
possibility of transcendence in cosmology. In 
more specific words: in what sense does intrinsic 
immanence of scientific assertions about reality 
retain in itself the elements of transcendence; or 
how the theoretical speech of scientific discourse 
retains the signs of that otherworldly ground of 
the overall facticity, which is fundamentally 
pretheoretical. One must not be surprised that 
this question is formulated by persons. In other 
words the retaining of transcendence means here 
the transcendence of persons as not reduced to 
that which is phenomenalised by the sciences. 
Seen in this way the difference between science 
(cosmology) and theology can be described in 
terms of the difference in expressing experience 
of transcendence. 
The explication of this last mentioned 
difference and the outline of the ways of 
reintegration of intentionalities employed in 
science and theology can be made on the level of 
those border-line situations where the excess of 
intuition of a phenomenon effectively blocks its 
discursive exhaustion and renders in it something 
which has not been intended and conditioned by 
experience. Here cosmology provides us with at 
least two issues relevant to our concern: cosmology 
of the origination of the universe as a single and 
unrepeatable event, and the issue of position of 
humanity in the universe in the perspective of 
an unrepeatable and incommunicable event of 
embodiment (incarnation) of every human person. 
The universe appears to humanity as given in its 
contingent facticity, but its sense and origin are 
not comprehended by humanity. Humanity, on 
the contrary, is comprehended on the basis of the 
event of communion with the universe in the very 
measure that this event is not comprehended. 
Similarly the event of birth as contingent 
hypostatic incarnation (the event of hypostasis in 
Levinas’ terminology (Levinas, 1987, pp. 42-43), 
is not comprehended by the personal subjectivity 
(this event does not show itself to subjectivity) 
but this person is comprehended on the basis of 
this event in the very measure that the person 
itself does not comprehend the event.44 It is the 
inability to comprehend the sense of embodiment 
in its hypostatic facticity that makes the problem 
of origin of the universe as well as the problem 
of origin of the personal existence one and the 
same unsolvable metaphysical mystery (c.f. 
Marcel, 1965, p. 24). Correspondingly, one can 
speak about incommensurability of the universe 
as well as the facticity of personal existence to all 
forms of conceptual thinking. It is the inability to 
comprehend the pre-theoretical and pre-conceptual 
in the givenness of the universe to human person 
as well as the givenness of the person to itself, 
that indicates that the universe and person show 
themselves in rubrics of immanent consciousness 
while remaining incomprehensible and retaining 
inexhaustibility in terms of conceptual thinking.
Concluding remarks 
The existential and phenomenological 
explication of the theological commitment in 
modern cosmology as the unfolding of the sense 
of the universe from within communion events 
entails that cosmology, in a way, turns out to be 
“subordinated” to anthropology. Philosophically 
this means that the interpretation of cosmological 
ideas is based on the epistemological centrality 
of humanity as such a kind of being from within 
which that which is called “the universe” is 
disclosed and constituted. Theologically, this 
means that the sense of the universe is established 
from within the relations between God and man, 
that is from within a concrete earthly history 
being an arena for these relations. As was 
expressed by C. Yannaras, if “the entire fact of the 
world to be constituted as an existential fact, then 
every reality is recapitulated in the relationship 
of humanity with an active reason (logos) as 
an invitation-to-relationship, which is directed 
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towards humanity alone” (Yannaras, 2004, 
p. 137). In both philosophical and theological 
aspects of such an approach to the universe 
one can find a phenomenological reversal of 
the anthropological problem: humanity is not 
inserted in the allegedly pre-existing cosmic 
history but, on the contrary, cosmological 
evolution has its origin in the history of the 
human as that primary and inherent existential 
beginning of any possible articulation of the 
world. This beginning expresses that which 
G. Marcel called the initial and unresolvable 
mystery of the human existence (Marcel, 1965, 
p. 24). It is that mystery which is associated with 
the fact of humanity’s creaturehood, its mystical 
coming into being through the act of the Divine 
love. It is the stance on the spiritual centrality 
of humanity in the universe and the presence of 
the Divine image in articulations of the universe 
which constitutes the essence of the theological 
commitment in studying the universe. A 
phenomenological method of treating the content 
of cosmological theories as the content of human 
experience, so to speak, their interiorisation by 
the ego, explicates a simple eidetic truth that 
cosmology manifests the spiritual condition of 
humanity, that condition which is subjected to 
a trial of free thinking of the universe. Physical 
cosmology mercilessly dooms human beings to 
homelessness in the universe, their mediocrity 
and effective non-existence in the divided, and 
sometimes non-consubstantial layers of physical 
reality. By so doing it subjects the human spirit 
to a severe test of resisting despair and oblivion 
and encourages transcendence, that is the sense 
of its commensurability with the eternal as the 
God-given ability to contemplate all temporal 
and spatial extensions (diastema) as having 
origin in the same otherness of their creation 
which consciousness has.
If one places such a vision of the universe in 
a cosmographic context, the resulting “spiritual 
cosmology” turns out to be geocentric, because 
it is anthropocentric. However this egocentricity 
has a theological foundation, for the meeting of 
God with humanity took place on Earth and it is 
in this event through which the basic divisions 
in creation have been archetypically overcome 
and brought to the unity. Then that geocentrism 
which pertains to the fact that the universe is 
disclosed from a specific and contingent location 
in the universe becomes an expression of the 
Christocentric essence of cosmology, for the 
very possibility of the integral knowledge of 
the physically disjoint world has its origin in 
the archetype of the Divine image in man, that 
is of Christ, understood not only as a carrier of 
the human nature, but also as the Logos-Word 
of God who did not cease to be at the right 
hand side of the Father and who continuously 
sustains creation and its economy at all scales 
and all remote corners of the universe. It is this 
archetype, when Christ is treated as the Lord of 
the world (Rev 1:16), which is gifted to humanity 
in order it could know the universe at the scales 
which incommensurably exceed in depth as well 
as at large the physical and biological parameters 
of the human existence. One can say that the very 
possibility of knowing the universe becomes in a 
certain way the experiencing of the event of the 
Incarnation of the Lord of the worlds from within 
which the universe manifests itself as an event of 
the human history. 
If, for a moment, one disregards a theological 
stance on the human existence and approaches it 
on the grounds of the physical and biological, as 
well as cognitive facticity, including the faculty 
of the rational comprehension of the world, 
the universe will appear to us from within the 
transcendental delimiters which pertain to the 
human condition. The universe is constituted 
from within these delimiters so that the picture of 
the universe comprises not only that which can be 
phenomenalised, that is represented as objects, 
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but the very conditions of the possibility of such 
a constitution. The possibility of elucidating 
these conditions in the strict discourse of the 
natural sciences seems to be doubtful. If one 
assumes that the cognitive faculties as well as 
human reason have foundation in something 
physical and biological, one looses here the 
problem of hypostatic, that is personal existence, 
for personhood is that aspect of the individually 
unrepeatable, isomorphic to the world existence 
with respect to which science can only think 
in terms of riddles. It is because of this that 
theology enters a cosmological discourse as a 
pointer to that from which the transcendental 
delimiters in the constitution of the universe can 
originate, namely to the Divine image in man. 
In this sense the explication of those epistemic 
procedures which are employed in cosmology, 
in its essence, will be the explication of content 
of the idea of the divine image in man, or, to 
be more precise, of that impetus which is still 
acting in humanity’s postlapserian condition 
and which attempts to restore the distorted 
image. Correspondingly, the method of such an 
explication, based in transcendental philosophy 
and phenomenology, becomes intrinsically 
manifesting that theological commitment which 
implicitly present in cosmology. Our desire to 
reflect upon knowledge of the universe from 
within experience of life corresponds to that 
endeavour of the modern philosophy of religion 
which overcomes that which Heidegger named 
“ontotheology”. In view of the objectives and 
tasks of the present research this would mean 
the overcoming of “ontocosmology” as that 
abstract science of the universe as a whole which, 
ultimately, in analogy with ontotheology must 
lead to the “death of the universe”, certainly not 
in a physical, but moral sense, as that kind of 
being which is devoid of the value and beauty 
by which the cosmos of ancient Greeks was 
filled in. 
1 Jean Ladrière expressed a thought that in order to explicate the analogy between the deep structure of nature and the 
structure of human existence as openness, creativity, possibility etc., one needs to enter what he called the “domain of the 
word” which, in our parlance, would correspond to thought within the “theological commitment”: “The problematic of 
nature can thus be linked with the problematic of human existence. Still there is no continuity between these two domains. 
There are perhaps indications pointing in a certain direction but it is not within the power of cosmological thought, even 
when developed, to become a consideration of finality, to enter the domain of the word. Only by meditation on what 
properly belongs to the word can one open another way of understanding (if one exists), leading towards…faith” (Ladrière 
1972, p. 186).
2 This is a different way of expressing that which Gabriel Marcel asserted in 1940 in his book Du Refus a l’Invocation 
(Marcel 1940), when he discussed a paradox related to the representation of the universe as an object: “The more I insist 
on the objectivity of things, thus cutting off the umbilical cord which binds them to my existence, that one which I call my 
organo-physical presence to myself, the more I affirm the independence of the world from me, its radical indifference to 
my destiny, my goals; the more the world thus proclaimed as the only real one, is converted into an illusory spectacle, a 
great documentary film offered for my curiosity, but which is ultimately abolished because of a simple fact that it ignores 
me. I mean that the universe tends to be annihilated in the measure that it overwhelms me. And this, I believe, is that which 
is forgotten whenever one attempts to crush man under the weight of astronomical facts” (p. 32). N. Berdyaev also was 
worried about the dominating power of nature upon human beings by calling it “slavery to nature”. To relieve oneself from 
this slavery one must exercise an “active resistance to those impersonal forces of the world which desires to tear in pieces 
and enslave it” (Berdyaev 1944, p. 49)(translation corrected). 
3 Positive certitude is typical for the sciences dealing with knowledge of objects can be described as that science operates 
with some precarious and incomplete data about these objects which are amended and corrected in the course of science’s 
progress. The paradox of science is exactly in that this uncertainty, corrigibility of its results is the condition for science 
to function at all. Another aspect of science is that it cannot know things in the context of the wholeness of the world. By 
contrast in philosophy, in what concerns its perennial questions about the world as a whole, there is no visible progress, so 
that it is able to speculate about the world only in rubrics of what is called by Jean-Luc Marion negative certitudes. (See 
details of this concept in (Marion 2010).
4 C.f. (Torrance 2001, p. 2). See also (Clément 1976, pp. 102-3).
5 One can point to Husserl, who in his Ideas I (§ 58) subjected God to reduction, bracketing it and depriving it of any trans-
conscious status (Husserl 1998).
6 For a systematic approach to such phenomena see (Marion 2002). See my paper (Nesteruk 2014) where the idea of satu-
rated phenomena is applied to the universe.
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7 Our usage of the adjective “existential” must be carefully distinguished from the same adjective which is sometimes used 
by cosmologists in the context of the stated smallness and insignificance of humanity in the universe; see, for example, 
(Primack, Abrams, 2006, pp. 273-78).
8 C.f. (Primack, Abrams 2006, p. 282), (Ladrière 1972, p.150).
9 See, for example, (Krauss 2012, pp. 118-19).
10 It is worth recalling Kierkegaard expressed in a dramatic form his anxiety about the impossibility to describe one’s posi-
tion in being: “One sticks his finger in the ground in order to judge where one is. I stick my finger in existence — it feels 
like nothing. Where am I? What is the ‘world’? What does this word mean? Who has duped me into the whole thing, and 
now leaves me standing there? Who am I? How did I come into the world; why was I not asked, why was I not informed 
of the rules and regulations… How did I come to be involved in this great enterprise called actuality? Why should I be 
involved in it? Am I not free to decide? Am I to be forced to be part of it? Where is the manager, I would like to make a 
complaint!” (Kierkegaard 2009, p. 60).
11 As was suggested elsewhere the universe as its past, even if human beings know their meaning only precariously, can be 
respected, as certain ancestors of our being, so that this respect can establish a sense of communion with the universe 
which overcomes loneliness and despair (Primack, Abrams 2006, p. 291).
12 (Pascal 1962, p. 199 (c.f. p. 113)) [English translation: (Pascal 1959, p. 78 (c.f. p. 39)].
13 Humanity, first of all, is not satisfied by that vision of its own place in the universe which positions it in the same way 
as “marble is in the bag” or a “cat is in the house”, or “a teacher is in the classroom”; “… it is at this point that a kind of 
rebellion takes place: the full reality of the individual is surely not exhausted by statistics, and the identity of the person de-
mands and appreciation of his situation in the world distinct from one’s situation in the world.” (Natanson, 1959, p. 233). 
14 The literature on this topic is vast. See a concise and eloquent review of recent discussions in (Halvorson, Kragh 2012). 
15 See a more elaborate formulation of a mysticism of immanence, for example, in (Comte-Sponville 2006, pp. 145-212). 
16 As was argued by G. Goutner, the alleged ideal of humanity, understood, for example as it unity, simply does not exist. 
One can think of it only in a modality of hope which has a religious nature (Goutner 2013). 
17 See examples of this in, for example, (Dawkins 2007), and (Stenger 2008).
18 See, for example (Comte-Sponville 2006).
19 This point was emphatically defended by C. Yannaras in his article “The Church in Post-Communist Europe”, (Yannaras 
2011).
20 This was the title of Ph. Sherrard’s book The Rape of Man and Nature: An Enquiry into the Origins and Consequences 
of Modern Science (Sherrard 1991), where he aggressively criticised modern science for the exaggeration of the sphere of 
applicability of its methods and resulting dehumanisation of humanity and desanctification of nature. 
21 For futurological accounts based on the threats originating in modern science see books of (Leslie 1996), and (Rees 
2003).
22 N. A. Berdyaev prophetically argued in the 1930s that humanity enters a new era when the stability of the world will 
depend on moral decisions of humanity of how to use technology available through scientific advance. See his paper 
(Berdyaev 1991).
23 Athanasius of Alexandria, Contra gentes, 35:4 [ET: Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, series 2, vol. 4].
24 Clement of Alexandria, The Stromatata, or Miscellanies, Book I, Ch. 5 [ET: Ante Nicene Fathers, vol. 2].
25 The importance of the rational faith, as the faith reflected and elucidated by reason, was accentuated by Thomas Aquinas 
(Summa Theologia, 1a,2,1) in his polemics with St. John of Damascus (Orthodox Faith, 1,3), according to whom faith in 
God is an innate quality. (See discussion of this issue in (Coplestone 1950, pp. 336-37.)
26 The problem of changing views on the role of subject and the sense of knowledge in history of philosophy (regardless to the 
Christian context) was carefully traced by Heidegger in his book on Nietzsche (Heidegger, 1997). Contraposing modernity 
to medieval scholastics (which he links to knowledge “associated with the order of salvation”), Heidegger points out that 
“man, independently and by his own effort, contrives to become certain and sure of his human being in the midst of be-
ings as a whole” (p. 89). According to Heidegger, the major task is search for the ways of such assurance, a method, which 
inevitably lead to the Cartesian formulation “Cogito ergo sum”. However, the proclamation of this thesis does not liberate 
the theologically committed ego from asking a question about the foundation of the very contingent facticity of cogito. 
This, as the Fathers of the Church asserted was not a question of knowledge as such, but the question about the logos of 
this knowledge. 
27 Nowadays such a distortion of anthropology leads to the formation and cultivation of a type of person whose ability to 
function in the conditions of dynamical communion is in a state of decline. This concerns first of all with the limited 
freedom of speech, independent thinking and judgement, in the conditions when the ability to imagination and even more, 
volition, are essentially supressed. 
28 This is a particular dimension of a possible response to the question posed by A. Walker more than twenty years ago: 
“Given that modernism by definition wants to scrutinise and criticise all traditional ways of thinking and expression-and 
modernism is no respect of confessions, for all historic and traditional commitments are grist to its critical mill – is there 
any way we can critically evaluate modernist thought from the perspective of historic Christianity?” (Walker 1988, p. 4).
29 In words of D. Staniloae: “The very existence of the Church is an effect, continually renewed of the action of the Holy 
Spirit in creating communion” (Staniloae 1980, p. 218) “The door of the infinite riches of the personal or interpersonal 
divine being has opened up before the reflections of Orthodox theology, and with it the prospects of an endless progress of 
the human spirit within the divine” (Ibid.) “The paradox of the Church mission in “this world” is just in that the power of 
the ecclesial influence of the world directly depends on the ability of the Church to be “bigger than the word”, to transcend 
the world and to see it through the “Divine vision””. (Filaret 2004, p. 53).
30 As it is emphatically advocated by J. L. Marion, theology deals with the saturated phenomena, whose phenomenality can-
not be embraced by means of scientific analysis. 
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31 This makes Christian theology flexible to any scientific developments without being assimilated by them. According to V. 
Lossky, Christian theology “..is able to accommodate itself very easily to any scientific theory of the universe, provided 
that this does not attempt to go beyond its own boundaries and begins impertinently to deny things which are outside its 
own field of vision” (Lossky 1957, p. 106). This accommodation means to remain critical to all scientific claims for mo-
nopoly of truth, that is to remain “meta-discourse”. 
32 This thought was discussed by J. Shakhovskoi in the context of the views of the physicist Max Planck on science and 
religion. Planck (Planck 1938)) compared the growth of scientific knowledge and of religious experience with two parallel 
lines. They have a common point of intersection, infinitely distant from ourselves, that is, distant from the present age and 
being in the age to come (Shakhovskoi 2003, p. 15). 
33 See in this respect: (Thunberg 1995), (Larchet 1996).
34 Such a “secular” theology, for example, would not be able to take into account liturgical rites, communities and commu-
nion as an indispensable component of experience of the Divine.
35 In a general context this implies the possibility of the critical evaluation of modernist thought from the perspective of 
historic Christianity. 
36 One implies here the duty of faith with respect to philosophy. Christian teaching on the Incarnation, in order to reveal God 
in its humanity, appeals to a new and superior reason which pertains to human reason. Christians do not have choice in 
possessing the “kind of reason”, that is logos, because they bear name of That one Who is the Logos Himself. This is the 
reason why Christians had to acquire the achievements of Greek philosophy and sciences (one may recall Clement of Al-
exandria who argued in favour if this). St. Augustine asserted that Christianity cannot be compared with ancient religions 
(theologia civilis and theologia fabulosa- political theology and mythological theology), with the only exception theologia 
naturalis (natural theology), that is with an attempt of rational knowledge of God through studying celestial movements. 
Augustine insists that the term theologia, for Christian faith, must be understood only as true knowledge of the Divine. 
Since the notion of truth is employed, “…comparison must be made with philosophy”; thus faith becomes, first of all the 
subject of philosophy because as Augustine affirms “the true philosopher is the lover of God” (Augustine 1980, p. 298). 
In spite of the fact that philosophy is not identified with knowledge of God, it is obliged to Christian theology in what 
concerns its rationality. It is because of this obligation that one could develop theo-logia, that is knowledge of God whose 
foundation comes from God himself. In this sense faith has its duty with respect to reason because it has duty with respect 
to itself. (See (Marion 2010[2], pp. 17-29).
37 See a book of (Albert 1992) where its author develops an idea of critical methodology of knowledge with following from 
there criticism with respect to theology. 
38 See, for example, H. Küng’s response to Albert’s critical assessment of theology in its pretension for rationality in (Küng 
1978, pp. 324-39, 439-51).
39 The scholars of Husserl pointed out that Husserl never talked about religion, God and mysticism explicitly in his pub-
lished works. Mall lists four books which concern with religious matters: The Crisis of the European Sciences, Erste 
Philosophie (Part 1), Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Vols. 1-2. Husserl, nevertheless, discusses religious 
issues in his unpublished manuscript. See details in (Mall 1991, p. 1). Assessing Husserl’s tension between his attitude 
to the problem of God as being the founder of phenomenology, on the one hand, and being a Christian believer, on the 
other, Mall states that “the chasm between the God of phenomenology and that of theology remains unbridged till it 
is bridged either by a fulfilment of intended meaning of the concept of God or the reality of God makes its entrance 
unto human consciousness via the routes of a mystic experience, revelation, faith or grace. The path phenomenology 
has legitimately to traverse is only the former one and not the latter. Husserl might have reconciled the two in his own 
person. But that’s a different story, then….” (p.13). See also a book of (Housset 1997, pp. 265-290), where the reader 
will be able to find a comprehensive bibliography on Husserl’s involvement in religious issues; as well as a book of 
(Bello 2009). 
40 In order to clarify the sense of what is meant by this, it is worth quoting T. Torrance where he refers to the question posed 
by K. Barth: “How do we come to think, by means of our thinking, that which we cannot think at all by this means? How 
do we come to say, by means of our language, that which we cannot say at all by this means?” There is always remains 
incongruence between God at the known and man as the knower. However, if the knowledge of God is to take place it must 
rest upon reality and grace of the object known. In this case the reality of things reveals itself to us and acts in us even in 
that case when the link between our knowledge and language is irreducible to the intrinsic relations between thought and 
speech. “ we are, therefore, restricted to the harp alternatives: either to be entirety silent, that is not even to venture the 
sceptical question…as in regard to the rationality of nature or the laws of thought…; or to ask question only within the 
circle of the knowing relationship in order to test the nature and possibility of the rational structures within it” (Torrance 
1997, pp. 54-55). Rephrasing this in terms of postmodern philosophical theology, how one can speak of the transcendent? 
Or, in other words, how can one speak of that which is incongruent with language and orders of conceptual thinking? 
How can one conceptualise that which is intrinsically non-conceptual, pre-conceptual or pre-theoretical? Will not be any 
speaking about phenomena whose phenomenality does not allow to be conceptualised a sort of violence and distortion 
with respect to these phenomena, reducing their phenomenality to the circle of immanent consciousness and, thus, depriv-
ing them of their otherness, that is if that which is retained in them beyond their phenomenalisation by consciousness? See, 
for example, (Marion 2002), (Smith 2002).
41 On the dimensions of a neo-Patristic synthesis in the dialogue between theology and science see Nesteruk, The Universe 
as Communion. 
42 This implies, according to Fr. D. Staniloae, that “any progress in understanding dogma depends in part on the progressive 
understanding that science has of the world”, however, and here he accentuates the theological commitment, “theological 
thinking cannot be separated from spirituality” and this is the reason why Orthodox theology “takes scientific progress 
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into account only in so far as science makes a contribution to the progress of the human spirit, and only in so far as it deep-
ens in man the experience of his own spiritual reality and of the supreme spiritual reality….” (Staniloae 1980, p. 216).
43 Here our position is reminiscent to some ideas from the so call “Radical Orthodoxy” theological movement. See, for 
example, a volume on the dialogue between Eastern Orthodoxy and “Radical Orthodoxy” (Pabst, Schneider 2009). 
44 A hypostatic human being appears to itself without controlling the conditions of its contingent appearance but attempt-
ing to phenomenalise it through the flow of life as directed to the future. In different words, subjectivity is extended here 
towards a non-intentional immanence, or reversed intentionality where the ego finds itself subject to, but not subject of, a 
givenness. The I no longer precedes the phenomena that it constitutes but is instead called into being as the one who re-
ceives this intentionality. The sense of the I is driven not by preconceived forms of subjectivity but by events whose sense 
is not immediately accessible to subjectivity but unfolds in time: the more we progress in time in seeing the universe, the 
more we comprehend the sense of its past; the more we grow in our life, the more sense we constitute out of the fact of our 
coming into being.
References
Albert, H., 1. Treatise on Critical Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Augustine, 2. City of God, Trans. D. Knowles (New York: Penguin Books, 1980). 
Athanasius of Alexandria, 3. Contra gentes, in eds. P. Schaff and H. Wace The Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers, series 2, vol. 4, (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1996).
Bello, A., 4. The Divine in Husserl and Other Explorations, Analecta Husserliana XCVIII 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2009). 
Berdyaev, N., 5. Slavery and Freedom (London: Centenary, 1944).
Berdyaev, N. A., “Man and Machine”, 6. Voprosy Filosofii, no. 8 (1991), pp. 147–62 (in 
Russian).
Clement of Alexandria, 7. The Stromatata, or Miscellanie, in A Roberts and J Donaldson (eds.), 
The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B.Eerdman Publishing Company, 1962).
Coplestone, F., 8. A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus 
(London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1950).
Heidegger, M., 9. Nietzsche. Volume IV: Nihilism (San Francisco: Harper, 1997). 
Clément, O., 10. Le Christ Terre des Vivants. Essais Théologiques Spiritualite Orientale, n. 17 
(Bégrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellfontaine, 1976).
Comte-Sponville, A., 11. L’esprit de l’athéisme. Introduction à une spiritualité sans Dieu (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 2006).
Dawkins, R., 12. The God Delusion (London: Black Swan, 2007). 
Filaret (Metropolotan), 13. The way of the life-asserting love (Kiev: Duh I Litera, 2004)(in 
Russian).
Goutner, G., “The Unity of Humanity in an Eschatological Perspective.” In Theology of 14. 
Creation, ed. A. Bodrov, M. Tolstoluzhenko, (Moscow: St. Andrew’s Biblical and Theological Institute, 
2013), pp. 230-36 (in Russian). 
Gurwitsch, A., 15. Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1966).
Halvorson, H., Kragh, H., “Theism and Physical Cosmology”, in 16. The Routledge Companion 
to Theism, ed. S. Goetz et al. (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 241-55. 
Heidegger, M., 17. Nietzsche. Volume IV: Nihilism (San Francisco, Harper, 1997).
Housset, E., 18. Pesonne et sujet selon Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997). 
Husserl, E., 19. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970).
– 37 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Sense of the Universe: towards a New Phenomenological Turn in the Dialogue between…
Husserl, E., 20. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. 
First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten. (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998).
Janicaud, D., 21. Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française (Combas: Éditions de 
l’éclat, 1990). 
Jaspers, K., 22. Weltgeschichte der Philosophie. Einleitung. (Munchen: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1982).
Kierkegaard, S., 23. Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M. G. Piety (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).
Krauss, L. M., 24. A Universe from Nothing (New York: Free Press, 2012).
Küng, H., 25. Does God Exist? An Answer for Today (London: SCM, 1978).
Ladrière, J., 26. Language and Belief (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972).
Larchet, J.-C., 27. La Divinisation de l’homme selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris, Les 
Editions du Cerf, 1996).
Leslie, J., 28. The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction (New York: 
Routledge, 1996). 
Levinas, E., 29. Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987).
Lossky, V. N., 30. The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London: James Clarke, 1957).
Mall, R., “The God of Phenomenology in Comparative Contrast to that of Philosophy and 31. 
Theology”, Husserl Studies 8 (1991), pp. 1-15. 
Marcel, G., 32. Du Refus a l’Invocation (Paris, Galllimard, 1940). 
Marcel, G., 33. Being and Having, (London: Collins, 1965). 
Marion, J.-L., 34. In Excess. Studies of Saturated Phenomena (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2002).
Marion, J.-L., 35. Certitudes négatives (Paris, Bernard Grasset, 2010).
Marion, J.-L., "La foi et la raison", 36. Le croire pour le voir. Réflexions diverses sur la rationalité 
de la révélation et l’irrationalité de quelques croyants (Paris: Editions Parole et Silence, 2010).
Natanson, M., “Being-in-Reality”, 37. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20, no. 2 
(1959). 
Nellas, P., 38. Deification in Christ. Orthodox Persepectives on the Nature of the Human Person 
(Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997). 
Nesteruk, A., 39. The Universe as Communion (London: T&T Clark, 2008).
Nesteruk, A. V., “The Universe as a Saturated Phenomenon: The Christian Concept of 40. 
Creation in View of Modern Philosophical and Scientific Developments”, Theology and Science 12, 
no. 3, 1014, pp. 236-59.
Pabst, A., Schneider, C., (eds.), 41. Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy. 
Transfiguring the World Through the Word, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
Pascal, B., 42. Pensées. Selections. Trans. & ed. Martin Jarret-Kerr (London: SCM, 1959).
Pascal, B., 43. Pensées, Trans. Louis Lafuma (Paris: Ed. Du Seul, 1962). 
Planck, M., “Religion und Naturwissenschaft”. 44. Vortag gehalten im Baltikum (Mai 1937) von 
Dr. Max Planck, 2te unveränd. Auflage. Joh. Ambrosius Barth Verl. Leipzig, 1938. 
Primack, J., Abrams, N. E., 45. The View from the Centre of the Universe. Discovering our 
Extraordinary Place in the Cosmos (London: Fourth Estate, 2006).
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Sense of the Universe: towards a New Phenomenological Turn in the Dialogue between…
Ratzinger, J., 46. Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie (Freiburg: Johannes Verlag Einsiedeln, 
1993).
Rees, M., 47. Our Final Century, A Scientist’s Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental 
Disaster Threaten Humankind’s Future in This Century – On Earth and Beyond (London: W. 
Heinemann, 2003).
Shakhovskoi, J., (Archbishop), 48. On the Mystery of Human Life (Moscow: Lodiya, 2003) (in 
Russian). 
Sherrard, Ph., 49. The Rape of Man and Nature: An Enquiry into the Origins and Consequences 
of Modern Science (Suffolk: Golgonooza, 1991).
Smith, J. K., 50. Speech and Theology. Language and the logic of incarnation (London: Routledge, 
2002).
Staniloae, D., 51. Theology and the Church (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1980).
Stenger, V. J., 52. God the Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows that God Does not Exist, (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 2008).
Thunberg, L., 53. Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the 
Confessor (Chicago: Open Court, 1995). 
Torrance, T., 54. Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburg, T&T Clark, 1997). 
Torrance, T., 55. The Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001). 
Walker, A., 56. Different Gospels (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988).
Yannaras, C., 57. Postmodern Metaphysics (Brookline, MS: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2004).
Yannaras, C., “The Church in Post-Communist Europe”, in 58. The Meaning of Reality. Essays 
on Existence and Communion, Eros and History (Los Angeles: Sebastian Press & Indiktos, 2011), pp. 
123-43.
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Sense of the Universe: towards a New Phenomenological Turn in the Dialogue between…
Смысл вселенной:  
к новому феноменологическому повороту  
в диалоге между космологией и богословием
А.в. Нестерук
Университет Портсмута
Лайон Гэйт Бюлдинг
ПОРТСМУТ, РО1 3НF, Великобритания
В статье обсуждается проблема интерпретации представлений о Вселенной как целого в 
космологии в контексте современного диалога между наукой и религией. Показывается, что 
сама возможность функционирования как космологии, так и богословия подразумевает их 
имплицитную включенность друг в друга. Таким образом, центральной проблемой диалога 
становится человек с его двойственной позицией в мире как органического существа, так и 
артикулирующего сознания всей Вселенной. Показывается несимметричность отношений 
между наукой и богословием и развивается идея богословского осмысления космологии, исходя 
из первичности факта жизни по отношению к возможности представлений о Вселенной. 
Обосновывается феноменологическая методология деконструкции "представлений" о 
Вселенной с целью нахождения источника базовых идей о ней в человеческой личности.
Ключевые слова: богословская преданность, вера, Вселенная, диалог, космология, личность, 
наука, религия, свободное мышление, человек. 
Научная специальность: 09.00.00 – философские науки.
